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Abstract 
 
Internationalization of  operations has been one of the most important tasks, with 
which companies have been confronted in recent years. Globalization of economy 
increasingly forces firms to explore new markets. 
 
Joint Ventures as a form of cooperation have in recent years gained importance as a 
means of internationalization. Yet, often Joint Ventures tend to be unstable or fail, 
because the expectations of the participating partners cannot be fulfilled. The ques-
tion arises how in each particular case a more sustained collaboration could be 
achieved by effective Joint Venture management. 
The issue of control is of vital importance in this matter. Control is defined as the 
ability of each partner to exert power over operational and strategic decisions inside 
an organizational structure.  
 
The aim of this paper, after a preliminary fixation on joint ventures, is to find estab-
lished and empirical-grounded insights about control of international joint ventures 
in Central Eastern Europe (CEE). A further question of this study is how effective 
control can be accomplished in this special region.  
 
Theoretical findings about the characteristics of the entry mode joint venture, its 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as theoretical foundations of control in busi-
ness co-operations and its aspects form the basis of the analysis. 
 
An overview of the cultural, geographical and economic conditions in Central East-
ern Europe  and a description of the possibilities and difficulties of market entry in 
this economic region extend the theoretical concepts.  
The following part is a detailed examination of the economic and cultural factors 
that influence control in a joint venture co-operation. The research focuses in par-
ticular on the relationship between patterns of control distribution, sociocultural 
differences between the target countries and provision of non-capital resources to 
the subsidiary by the parents.  
 
v 
The theoretical findings are tested in an empirical study of 54 international joint 
ventures between Austrian parents and local partners from five CEE countries. 
A final section comprises a recapitulation of the major findings and a discussion of 
implications for the management of international joint ventures in CEE. 
 
Keywords: market entry, joint venture, control, business culture, sociocultural dis-
tance, transaction cost economics, resource based view 
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1. Introduction 
 
Media continuously discuss the terms globalization and multinational enterprises. 
The driving force behind this development is an always increasing level of interna-
tional competition and the business conditions it creates. Frequent technological 
innovations, shorter product life cycles und diminishing barriers to market entry 
imply greater demands for companies and new challenges for managers (cf. 
Träm/Müllers-Patel 1999, p.36). Firms will have to compete in areas with good 
prospects to maintain market shares (cf. Jagoda 1990, p.10). Internationalization 
will become more and more important for firms in order to persist in highly com-
petitive markets and to secure survival. The growing importance of transnational 
exchange of goods as well as economical and political shifts demand in higher ef-
forts from multinational enterprises (cf. Engelhardt/Seibert 1981, p.428; Hermann 
et al 2003, p.49).  
 
Cooperations with other firms have been a strategic option for a long time: „Unter-
nehmensziele können schneller, wirkungsvoller, mit geringem Risiko und effizien-
ter erreicht werden, wenn zwei oder mehrere Unternehmen ihre Vorhaben und Pro-
jekte gemeinsam im Eingriff nehmen. Auf diesem Wege kann die Daueraufgabe der 
Erhaltung und der Steigerung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit oft besser und nachhaltiger 
gelöst werden“ (cf. Schmoll 2001, p.9). Joint Ventures and co-operations are cru-
cial considerations for a strategy in international competition: new markets with 
regional advantages, technologies and firm capabilities can be better exploited and 
combined. (cf. Rumer 1994, p.13; Bleeke/Ernst 1992, p.120; Badaracco 1991, 
p.17).  
 
„Bei grenzüberschreitenden Kooperationen kommt dem Erkennen, der Beachtung 
und der angemessenen Reaktion  auf fremde Firmen- und Landeskulturen besonde-
re Bedeutung zu“ (cf. Schmoll 2001, p.12).  Especially market entry in Eastern Eu-
rope is interesting for firms. The integration of twelve Eastern European countries 
in the EU created the largest economic region in the world. Yet, Eastern Europe is 
still termed „wild“ and associated with uncertainty and risk. (cf. Booker 2007, 
p.13). This may be due to the fact, that Eastern Europe can still be regarded as un-
explored territory in terms of business relations. The region offers many possibili-
ties for foreign investors to achieve sustained prosperity, but also comprises various 
difficulties and dangers resulting from cultural and economic differences. The im-
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portance of a sound strategy for market entry of an enterprise investing in Eastern 
Europe cannot be underestimated. The term market entry is defined as a number of 
interconnected actions or arrangements, which enable a firm to engage in a foreign 
market or country. 
 
Joint Ventures as a mode of market entry constitute the starting point for the inves-
tigation at hand. Several features make joint ventures a particular interesting form 
of market entry: split investment, shared control by co-operation partners and crea-
tion of a stand-alone business unit with independent legal status.  
In recent years joint ventures have been regarded as an optimal choice for intensi-
fied collaboration between free market economies and former centrally planned 
economies and have been termed the strategic favorite of the nineties (cf. Bircher 
1990, p.15).  
 
According to Mr. Bleicher from the department for business administration of the 
University of St. Gallen „stellen Joint Ventures eine faszinierende Form unter-
schiedlicher Betätigung dar: in wenigen anderen Organisationsformen können Un-
ternehmen Ihre Stärken so geschickt mit denen anderer Unternehmen kombinieren 
und gleichzeitig ihre Ressourcen so sehr schonen. Gleichzeitig wird deutlich, dass 
auch Joint Ventures Grenzen des Einsatzes haben. Die Faszination bleibt, jedoch 
mit einem gesunden Maß an kritischer Distanz“ (cf. Rumer 1994, p.63). The multi-
tude of articles which report failure of business co-operations make clear that the 
difficulties of joint ventures should not be underestimated. Indeed this form of co-
operation has its own problems. There is a story which emphasizes the dangers of 
joint venture collaboration: A chicken suggests a joint venture to a pig. The pig 
asks the chicken what shall be produced. The chickens answer is “ham and eggs”. 
Initially the pig is impressed by the sheer market potential, but after some moments 
a thought comes to his mind: “But when this business is finished I will be dead and 
gone, whereas you will still be living” whereupon the chicken states: “Well, this is 
the sense of a joint venture” (cf. Raffèe/Eisele 1994, p.17). The overall failure rate 
of joint ventures is estimated fifty percent (cf. Bleeke/Ernst 1992, p.118-119; Jago-
da 1990, p.12, Crovitz 2005, p.12). Many managers shy away from establishing a 
business unit with another partner or miss the possibility of joint ventures, because 
they are not sure in which cases possible advantages compensate for eventual prob-
lems (cf. Bamford et al 2004, p.78). Despite this set of problems the popularity of 
joint ventures is increasing, especially for solving problems on the business level 
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and also on an international level. Notably by the end of the eighties the entry mode 
joint venture became the „am meisten gewählte Kooperations- und Investitionsform 
zwischen Unternehmen“ and a favorite field of research in organizational und man-
agement studies (cf. Eppenberger 1994, p.861). The transformation process in East-
ern Europe plays a major role in this context. In the early eighties some 43 joint 
ventures with western firms existed in the whole COMECON (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) area. By the year 1993 they comprised approximately 50.000 
in Hungary alone. In the former Soviet Union about 1.200 joint ventures had been 
registered in 1990 and 25.000 in 1993 (cf. Meyer 1998, p.32). 
 
1.1 Research problem and relevance of the subject 
 
In a joint venture for a particular situation a foreign investor needs a specific extent 
of ability to monitor and control the actions of the co-operating business units. Con-
trol is defined as the ability of each partner to exert power over operational and 
strategic decisions inside the organizational structure of the co-operation. The more 
pronounced the power of the foreign investor in terms of control is, the more quick-
ly and effective he can react to changes in the environment or implement strategic 
actions. Whereas exporting or licensing as a form of market entry provide compara-
tively few possibilities of influence, a wholly owned subsidiary allows for widely 
independent decisions about every area of operation. 
 
Joint ventures in contrast, which are located in a mid range with respect to control 
extent, require the coordination of a parent’s targets and strategies with the part-
ner’s expectations. How the extent of control is distributed between the parties de-
pends on the specific institutional arrangement of the co-operation. 
Because great extent of control generally involves costly measures, the choice of 
institutional arrangement should not necessarily be guided by the principle of max-
imizing control. Rather it seems reasonable to strive only for the necessary or the 
most efficient degree of control. 
 
In the literature about joint venture control in most cases the equity share of a part-
ner was regarded as the constitutive factor of his respective influence and control 
extent. The higher the share in terms of equity of a party the greater its power. Yet, 
a higher equity share also means taking a higher risk. As it was said before the cost-
benefit ratio should be kept balanced, so a high equity share may sometimes not be 
4 
the optimal choice. Moreover, recent studies point to the direction, that equity share 
is at least not the most important source of control. With respect to efficiency other 
factors than equity share, which may have influence on control, should be consi-
dered, namely provision of critical knowhow, market expertise and cultural and 
geographical circumstances in the joint venture target country. Further, some atten-
tion should be paid to psychological mechanisms. Careful adjustment of the extent 
and focus of control mechanisms on various levels of joint venture operation can 
play a vital role for the implementation of a foreign parent’s control strategy. 
 
1.2 Research design and method 
 
The research consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. 
 
Theoretical findings about the characteristics of the entry mode joint venture, its 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as theoretical foundations of control in busi-
ness co-operations and the influence of economical and cultural factors on control 
form the basis of the analysis. 
 
As a first step a definition of the term joint venture is presented. By contrasting the 
entry form joint venture with other forms of entry and their respective possibilities 
of exerting control on the actions of a business unit the characteristics of joint ven-
tures will be clarified. 
 
In a second step an overview of the cultural, geographical and economic circums-
tances in Central Eastern Europe will be given. Attention is paid to specific charac-
teristics of the region and the dangers and possibilities of market entry is this area.  
The economic development after the fall of the iron curtain and cultural aspects of 
Austria and its neighbors in the region will be investigated.  
 
The third step comprises a detailed examination of control in international co-
operations and joint ventures. Different dimensions of control and their intercon-
nections in the joint venture context will be analyzed. Special focus is laid on the 
variety of control mechanisms and the relevance of the parent’s provision of re-
sources for the respective extent of control. 
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Step four provides an overview of studies on business culture. Several dimensional 
models of cultural differences between nations will be presented and the dimen-
sional model of Hofstede will be explained in detail. The findings of studies on 
sociocultural distance and its influence on joint venture control and -performance 
shall shed a light on the role of culture in the context of international management 
and control of foreign subsidiaries. 
 
Step five is a theoretical model for the investigation of control of joint ventures in 
Central Eastern Europe. Two of the most frequent applied theories in the field of 
control and choice of entry form are explained, namely resource based view of bar-
gaining theory and transaction cost theory. Elements of both theories are combined 
to form a theoretical model. Two hypotheses, which concern the role of resource 
provision by the parents and sociocultural distance between the foreign investor’s 
country and the target country, will be derived from the theoretical model. 
 
The final step is an empirical analysis of 54 joint ventures between Austrian parents 
and partners from Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The 
research is based on an inquiry of forty small and medium sized enterprises from 
Austria in spring 2002 (first phase) and a set of fourteen additional selected firms 
one year later (second phase). The theoretical model will be tested with qualitative 
analysis of the inquiry data and multivariate statistical methods (regression, analy-
sis of variance). 
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2. International Joint Ventures as a Form of Business 
Co-operation 
 
2.1 Joint venture definition 
 
In the literature substantial differences in the meaning of the term joint venture and 
its delineation can be noticed. There is also a great discrepancy between the usage 
of the term joint venture in literature and in general linguistic usage. 
Various Authors use different concepts of the term joint venture. „Ein Gemein-
schaftsunternehmen ist eine auf Kapitalbeteiligung und der Teilung von Geschäfts-
führung und Risiko beruhende, vertraglich festgelegte und dauerhafte zwischenbe-
triebliche Kooperation“ (cf. Rumer 1994, p.63; Zentes 1992, p.4-5; Endres 1987, 
p.374; Ley/Schulte 2003, p.1-2; Hermann et al 2008, p.7; Posth/Bergmann 1997, 
p.537; Engelhardt/Seibert 1981, p.428), a partnership which involves a substantial 
amount of resource provision in the form of capital, technology, property rights, 
knowhow or assets (cf. Schmoll 2001, p.36). By combining resources of two or 
more firms a conjoint, legally independent enterprise is created (cf. Fröhlich 1991, 
p.14). An increase in market share can be the consequence of establishing a joint 
venture. Joint ventures are especially suited for an expansive strategy (cf. Liess-
mann 1990, p.75). 
 
Several countries prohibit free access to their markets and often forming a joint 
venture with a local or governmental partner is prescriptive and the only possibility 
to gain access to a national market. In the case of an international joint venture a 
foreign investor collaborates with a local partner from the target country to estab-
lish a subsidiary, which is owned and controlled conjointly.  
 
2.2. Differentiation between joint ventures and other forms of 
business collaboration  
 
To clarify the notion of joint ventures it seems useful to outline the differences be-
tween this form of co-operation and other forms of business collaboration. 
 
The term joint venture is used, when two or more legally and economically inde-
pendent partners operate an enterprise with at least some congruent goals and both 
parties participate in the management as well as the risks resulting from the enter-
prise. Management as well as bearing of risks can be shared equally between the 
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partners, but other patterns of partitioning are possible and common. The parties in 
a joint venture agreement can be firms but also governmental institutions or other 
organizations. In short the essential characteristics of a joint venture are (1) the le-
gal and economical independency of the parties (2) conjoint management of the 
enterprise and (3) shared bearing of the (financial) risks resulting from the enter-
prise (cf. Weder 1989, p.33; Pausenberger 1989, p.624). 
 
A great variety of forms of business collaboration exists. A rough classification can 
be undertaken by consideration of the strength of the relationship between the part-
ners of the collaboration. The strength of the relationship depends on the degree of 
restriction of independence of the partners in legal and economic terms. 
 
Figure 2.1: Differentiation between  joint ventures and other forms 
of business collaboration  
 
Source: Author 
 
Forms of business collaboration can be classified in collaborations in which there is 
no independence of the partners and collaborations with only limited independency 
of the partners. Shareholding in a corporation without influence on management or 
strategy is termed capital investment or portfolio investment and constitutes no 
business collaboration (cf. Weder 1989, p.34). Business collaborations in which the 
independency of the partners is only limited shall be termed business cooperation. 
The main distinctive feature of business co-operations is the collaboration or the 
mutually adjusted behavior of the more or less independent partners.  If, by con-
trast, the independency of one or several partners is abolished totally, and therefore 
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no mutual adjustment of behavior is necessary any more, the collaboration shall be 
termed business aggregation (cf. Pausenberger 1989, p.623; Weder 1989, p.42). 
 
Figure 2.1 outlines the different forms of business collaboration and their further 
classification. 
 
 
2.2.1. Delineation of different forms of business aggregation 
 
Collaborations in the form of business aggregation are characterized by the fact, 
that at least one collaborating partner is losing his economic independency. A new 
single business unit with centralized management comes into being, hence the term 
business aggregation (cf. Pausenberger 1989, p.624). The loss of economic inde-
pendency clearly distinguishes business aggregations from joint ventures, which are 
in fact characterized by the independency of the partners (cf. Weder 1989, p.42). 
 
Fusion 
 
A fusion means not only loss of economic independency of at least one partner but 
also loss of his legal status as an independent business unit. A single business unit 
with legal status is created. Fusions can be further classified into mergers and ac-
quisitions (cf. Pausenberger 1989, p.624). 
 
Merger or fusion by means of new formation 
 
The fusion of two or more firms into a newly created one is termed merger or fu-
sion by means of new formation. The legal and economical independency of the 
participating firms is abolished and transferred to the newly created entity. The new 
business unit incorporates the combined management as well as the entrepreneurial 
risk of the former enterprises (cf. Weder 1989, p.42). 
 
Acquisition or fusion by means of annexation 
 
A fusion of two or more firms, where at least one partner retains his legal and eco-
nomical independency is termed acquisition or fusion by means of annexation. The 
managerial responsibilities and the entrepreneurial risk of the incorporated firm are 
transferred to the acquiring firm (cf. Weder 1989, p.43). An acquisition is only 
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possible in cases in which transferable corporate rights exist (cf. Fellner et al. 2000, 
p.29). 
 
Minority shareholding 
 
Also participating with a minority share results in a loss of economic independency 
and can be regarded as a form of business aggregation. Often minority shares con-
stitute a preliminary stage to a fusion or establishment of a corporate group (cf. 
Weder 1989, p.43). 
 
Establishment of a corporate group 
 
The aggregated corporations are economically unified under a uniform manage-
ment. The legal status of the individual firms by contrast is retained, though. This is 
accomplished by the group parent by means of acquisition of a majority or full 
share and eventually by establishment of contractual arrangements and personnel 
linkages (cf. Pausenberger 1989, p. 624). A wholly owned subsidiary allows the 
parent comprehensive economic influence and complete control of all activities of 
the incorporated enterprise (cf. Tamm 1993, p.58). 
 
2.2.2. Delineation of different forms of business co-operation 
 
A distinctive feature of co-operations is the fact, that the legal and economical in-
dependency of the participating firms is retained in principle. Limitations of the 
freedom to manage and control actions only apply to explicitly defined activities 
and tasks in conjunction with the collaboration (cf. Pausenberger 1989, p.623). 
Basically business co-operations can be classified into co-operations with capital 
interlocking and co-operations without. Capital interlocking means that all partners 
are bound by contract to participate with a certain equity share in the conjoint 
project. If this characteristic is missing, the business collaboration is termed co-
operation without capital interlocking (cf. Tamm 1993, p.51). Joint ventures are the 
only business co-operation with capital interlocking. All other forms of business 
co-operation, including contractual joint ventures, are co-operations without capital 
interlocking. 
 
Consortia 
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Consortia are frequently established to accomplish tasks, which are temporarily or 
otherwise delimited. Just like with joint ventures the participating parties are legal 
and economical independent.  Normally all partners also participate in the mana-
gerial responsibilities and the entrepreneurial risk. Therefore a precise differentia-
tion between joint ventures and consortia is not possible. Instead consortia can be 
regarded as a temporal form of contractual joint venture (cf. Weder 1989, p.47). 
 
Licensing 
 
The licensor grants the license holder the right to use his property at the agreed ex-
tent upon payment of a royalty by means of a contract (cf. Goldenberg 1990, p.13). 
The objects of license agreements can be products or services of the licensor, for 
instance knowhow, patents, corporate design, copyrights or brands (cf. Kotler 2006, 
p.630). The agreement can comprise regulations on geographic locations (certain 
markets), quantitative limitations (specific output) or temporal restrictions of the 
usage. Licensing is differentiated from joint ventures by the fact, that one partner, 
namely the licensor, takes no entrepreneurial risk, because the royalty is contrac-
tually defined and can therefore be calculated (cf. Weder 1989, p.47). This form of 
cooperation is well suited if high costs for research and development shall be recap-
tured, without creating further costs for production or sales (cf. Kruse 1993, p.46; 
Sachse 2003, p.128). 
 
Franchising 
 
Franchising is a special case of licensing. The franchisor grants the franchisee upon 
payment of a royalty the exercise of precisely stipulated rights, which belong to the 
franchisor. By contrast to licensing, the franchisor has considerably more extensive 
possibilities to monitor and control the actions of the franchisee (cf. Adams/Jones 
1997, p.21-23). The franchisee commits himself by contract to comply with direc-
tives, which determine the customs and modalities of business (cf. Hill 1994, 
p.405). This may include the adoption of a prescribed range of products, organiza-
tional or logistic structures and methods as well as brands or trademarks. In return 
the franchisor commits himself to services like training of the franchisee’s em-
ployees, marketing, business consultancy or even provision of entire facilities (cf. 
Tamm 1993, p.55). Franchising is also clearly distinguished from joint ventures, 
because after signing of the agreement the franchisee remains the only one who 
takes the entrepreneurial risk. 
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Management agreement 
 
During a management agreement a consultant commits himself to participate in the 
managerial responsibilities of an enterprise in return for a predetermined compensa-
tion. The differentiation from joint ventures is analogue to licensing, because no 
separate business unit is created and bearing of risks of the enterprise is not shared 
(cf. Weder 1989, p.48). 
 
2.3. Different forms of joint ventures 
 
In the business literature numerous approaches to classify joint ventures exist, 
which shall be described below. Table 2.1 (cf. Eisele 1995, p.18) lists common di-
mensions of joint venture forms: 
 
Table 2.1: Dimensions of joint venture forms and their respective values: 
 
Dimension 
 
Joint Venture Form 
Spatial 
Domestic International 
Traditional Non-Traditional 
 
Temporal Permanent Temporary 
 
Contractual Equity Contractual 
 
Source: according to Eisele (1995), p.18 
 
With regard to spatial dimension and provenance joint ventures can be classified as 
domestic joint ventures, where two or more partners from the same country form a 
conjoint enterprise to achieve common goals in the home country (cf. Hoßfeld 
1994, p.302), and as international joint ventures. Joint ventures shall be termed 
international, if at least two parties originate from different countries (cf. Rumer 
1994, p.64; Weder 1989, p.51; Hoßfeld 1992, p.302) and the origin of at least one 
partner is not identical with the target country of the joint venture (cf. Weder 1989, 
p.51; Hoßfeld 1994, p.302; Eisele 1995, p.19). If at least one partner has its origin 
in Eastern Europe, the enterprise shall be termed east-west joint venture (cf. 
Fröhlich 1991, p.13). Internationality of a joint venture manifests itself in several 
dimensions. On the one hand it is important whether participating firms originate 
from different countries. On the other hand the context of operation of the joint 
venture is important. In particular the confrontation of different cultural areas, cha-
racterized by different language, conduct of business, different modes of bargain-
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ing, has frequently been of importance (cf. Probst/Rüling 1999, p.9). The extent of 
economical independency of the participating firms is subject to the discretion of 
the partners and is stipulated in the joint venture agreement (cf. Rumer 1994, p.26). 
With regard to expansion of markets joint ventures can be classified as traditional 
joint ventures and as non-traditional joint ventures (cf. Weder 1989, p.51). The 
range of products or services of a traditional joint venture is confined to the borders 
of the country in which it is located. By contrast a non-traditional joint venture ex-
ports its services or products.  
 
Partners can pursue the co-operation temporary or permanently. If the aim of the 
venture is to reach a temporary limited goal, the co-operation expires after 
achievement. Yet, an unscheduled termination of a joint venture does not necessari-
ly mean a failure of the enterprise. Frequently a successful joint venture comes to 
an end, because a financially more powerful partner acquires the share of the less 
affluent partner and transforms the joint venture into a wholly owned subsidiary (cf. 
Bleeke/Ernst 1992, p.125-127).  
 
According to Weder (1989) joint ventures can additionally be classified as equity 
joint ventures and as contractual joint ventures. The distinguishing feature of equi-
ty joint ventures is the fact, that a separate business unit with equity and indepen-
dent legal status is created, whereas in contractual joint ventures no separate unit is 
created.  If two or more partners launch a conjoint enterprise, where they participate 
in the managerial responsibilities and the entrepreneurial risk, we shall speak of an 
equity joint venture (cf. Posth/Bergmann 1997, p.537). 
 
Commitment of the partners to the venture is much higher in equity joint ventures 
than in contractual joint ventures. Equity joint ventures also represent a form of 
direct investment, with the possibility of majority-, minority or equal shares (cf. 
Hoßfeld 1994, p.302). If all partners have equal shares (and therefore equal voting 
rights), the question arises how to govern the venture. This dilemma is particularly 
important in joint ventures with a 50:50 ownership split (cf. Perlitz et al 1996, p.3). 
Equity joint ventures are particularly well suited in cases, where the combination of 
assets and competences creates synergies and additional benefit. However, equity 
joint ventures only make sense, if the expected profits warrant the foundation of a 
separate business unit with own personnel and culture (cf. Bamford et al 2004, 
p.78). If a joint venture exists only as a reason of formal obligations and the colla-
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boration is based on a contract (cf. Perlitz 1997, p.454-455; Henzler 1992, p.92; 
Bassen et al 2001, p.414), which assigns costs, risks and profits from the project to 
the partners without establishing a separate business unit, the collaboration shall be 
termed contractual joint venture (cf. Weder 1989, p.36-38; Schaumburg 1999, 
p.51; Ley/Schulte 2003, p.1; cf. Raupp 1997, p.357). 
 
Subject of the following analyses and investigations are equity joint ventures based 
on co-operations between Austrian and Eastern European firms. In the following 
the term joint venture is exclusively used to denote equity joint ventures. 
 
2.4. Strategic and operational aspects of the market entry form 
joint venture 
 
„In der Feudalzeit Japan besiegelten die Daimyos (Feudalherren) Allianzen durch 
Zweckheirat. Auch von europäische Königshäusern und amerikanischen Industrie-
magnaten sind Ehen aus strategischen Gründen bekannt. Das heute in der ganzen 
Welt praktizierte Geschäftsmodell solcher Zusammenschlüsse ist das internationale 
Joint Venture, bei dem sich Partner aus verschiedenen Ländern die Hände reichen“ 
(cf. Goldenberg 1990, p.11).  
 
2.4.1. Motives for engaging in joint ventures 
 
Business literature is full of motives for engaging in joint ventures and utilization 
potentials. A comprehensive compilation and comparison of motives for the choice 
of joint ventures is found at Harrigan (1996), who differentiates between internal, 
competitive and strategic targets. Typical reasons for engaging in joint ventures 
from an internal viewpoint are diversification of costs and risks, securing resources 
which are not readily available on markets, utilization of economies of scale, access 
to new technologies and customers, acquiring new management techniques and the 
possibility to encourage and challenge employees by assigning them managerial 
responsibilities of the joint venture. Joint ventures allow for both: co-operation and 
independent operation of the venture (cf. Probst/Rüling 1999, p.7-8).  A common 
starting point of considerations is the idea of focusing on core competencies and as 
a consequence increasing specialization, division of labor and outsourcing of busi-
ness operations. Another starting point is the need to consult and draw on other 
firms to secure market shares and enter new markets (cf. Probst/Rüling 1999, p.7; 
Backes-Gellner/Huhn 2000, p.184), whereupon partner firms may be compensated 
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with financial or managerial support (cf. Kotler 2006, p.631-632). If a project is 
very large it may be beyond the possibilities of a single firm. In such cases joint 
ventures serve as a possibility to reduce costs (cf. Kinkel/Lay 2004, p. 428). Inter-
national joint ventures are an interesting solution if development costs in an indus-
try cannot be afforded by a national market alone or if development resources of 
several countries shall be combined (cf. Jagoda 1990, p.12).  Joint ventures in East-
ern Europe have been frequently chosen because of the inaccessibility of the mar-
kets in this region (cf. Frauendorfer/Lanschützer 1992, p.34-35; Rumer 1994, p.32-
33; Hall 1984, p.2).  
From a competitive viewpoint joint ventures are established to influence the com-
petitive environment and the structure of an industry in a desired way, to gain com-
petitive strength by forming larger entities, to gain first mover advantages or to es-
cape the confines of highly competitive markets. 
Strategic objectives are creation and utilization of synergies, transfer of technolo-
gies and competencies and the possibility of diversification through co-operation 
(cf. Harrigan 1996, p.56-59). Table 2.2 lists the most important motives for engag-
ing in joint ventures. 
 
Table 2.2: Motives for engaging in joint ventures 
 
Motives for engaging in joint ventures 
 
Internal 
 
• Diversification of costs and risks  
• Economies of scale  
• Access to new technologies and customers 
 
 
Competitive 
 
• Influence industry structure 
•  Creation of stronger entities 
• Low labor costs 
•  
 
Strategic 
 
• Utilization of synergies 
• Transfer of competencies and technologies 
• Diversification of products or services 
 
 
Source: Harrigan 1996, p.56-59, Posth/Bergmann 1997,pS. 538 
 
2.4.2. Joint venture partner choice 
 
A clear consensus between the partners of a joint venture about the targets and the 
mode of operation of the conjoint enterprise is vital for success of the venture (cf. 
Liessmann 1990, p.29; Goldenberg 1990, p.45-50). During the process of develop-
ing a market entry strategy the choice of suitable partners is one of the most impor-
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tant tasks (cf. Larimo/Rumpunen 2006, p.119; Jagoda 1990, p.12). The most impor-
tant criteria for the partner choice are complementarity and compatibility. Partners 
shall complement each other with regard to their activities and competences and 
shall also aim at fulfillment of common business goals. „Je grösser der Unterschied 
bezüglich der Stärken und die Ähnlichkeit im Hinblick auf die globalen Geschäfts-
ziele der Partner, desto geringer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Misserfolges“ (cf. 
Jagoda 1990, p.12-13). 
 
2.5. Assets and drawbacks of international joint ventures in 
Eastern Europe 
 
A short compilation of advantages and disadvantages, which may arise in joint ven-
tures with partners from Eastern Europe, is given in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Assets and drawbacks of international joint ventures in Eastern Europe 
 
Advantages 
 
 
• Enhancing of quality by pooling of knowhow 
• Partner provides local market knowledge 
• Partner provides business contacts and knowledge of local authorities 
• Sharing of costs 
• Participation in risk bearing decreases opportunistic behavior. 
• Local partner relieves national resentment 
• Partner is familiar with local language  
• Diversification of risks 
•  
 
Disadvantages 
 
 
• Loss of independency 
• Loss of flexibility 
• High costs due to difficulties in management implementation 
• High conflict potential 
• Danger of  proprietary knowledge leakage 
• Sharing of profits 
• Difficulties due to inconsistent management styles 
• Danger of loss of company secrets 
• Difficult integration of the joint venture 
 
 
Sources: Frauendorfer/Lanschützer 1992, p.34-35; Rumer 1994, p.32-33;  
Endres 1987, p.374-375; Goldenberg 1990, p.13;  
Larimo/Rumpunen 2006, p.133-132; Kotler 2006, p.63 
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3. Control of International Joint Ventures 
 
3.1. Control of organizations 
 
3.1.1. Definition 
 
Control of organizations is the process by which an organizational unit influences 
to a greater or lesser extent the behavior of another organizational unit, including 
the impacts which result from this behavior. Organizations can be business units 
but also governmental institutions or other organizations. The means to exercise 
control comprise the use of power and authority as well as a broad spectrum of bu-
reaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.237). 
 
3.1.2. Relevance of control 
 
Control is an important factor for the ability of an enterprise to achieve its objec-
tives. In the long run implementation of company goals depends highly on the ma-
nagerial capability to develop a strategy, which makes the best use of the firm-
specific competences in one or several critical areas of business activity. Complexi-
ty and differentiation of organizational structures generally increase with the size of 
an organization, as do risk of conflict between organizational units and opportunis-
tic behavior. Therefore in expanding enterprises management is increasingly re-
sponsible for monitoring, coordinating and integrating the various activities of the 
firm (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.237). 
 
3.2. Control in international joint ventures 
 
3.2.1. Definition 
 
Control of joint ventures describes the influence of the parents of a joint venture, 
which is exercised on the conjoint management (cf. Choi/Beamish 2004, p.202). A 
more differentiated view identifies control as the process by which a parent secures, 
that the joint venture is managed according to its interests and objectives (cf. 
Yan/Gray 1994, p.1481). The last definition accounts for the fact, that parent firms 
occasionally do not want to control all areas of joint venture activity but only stra-
tegic important parts (cf. Schaan 1983, p.57; Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.240). By 
contrast to other types of enterprise, control of joint ventures can be exercised by 
more than one party simultaneously, which makes it a more complex and more dif-
ficult task to comprehend (cf. Yan/Gray 1994, p.1481). 
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3.2.2. Relevance of control in the joint venture context 
 
Many studies assume that the configuration of control with reference to the interac-
tion of the parents is a critical factor for efficiency and performance of a joint ven-
ture and the implementation of a parent’s strategy (cf. Yan/Gray 1994, p. 1478; 
Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.236). According to the opinion of managers from western 
countries, control of joint ventures is a more difficult task than control of other 
types of enterprise. Whereas the business objectives of joint ventures are generally 
similar to wholly owned subsidiaries, the task of coordinating, monitoring and inte-
grating activities tends to be much more complex. Parents of a joint venture have 
their own staff on the premises and are much more powerful than for instance 
shareholders of a company with widely held stock. Conflicts between partners have 
to be solved internally and if two parents have incongruent business objectives they 
might disagree in many areas (cf. Killing 1983, S.8). Another important aspect of 
control in the joint venture context is the protection of a parent’s strategy, technolo-
gical knowhow or other valuable assets from exploitation by partners. Leakage of 
specific knowledge can diminish its value or create new competitors in a market 
(cf. Geringer/ Herbert 1989, p. 236).   
 
3.2.3. Dimensions of control in international joint ventures 
 
Control of international joint ventures is a complex and multidimensional concept. 
Typically control of international joint ventures is viewed under different aspects 
on three dimensions: (1) the mechanisms of exercising control, which are adopted 
by the parents; (2) the extent or degree of control, which a parent aspires or is able 
to achieve and (3) the focus of control, that is the choice of activities a parent wish-
es to control, while leaving control of the other areas to another parent. These three 
parameters should however not be considered separately or isolated. Instead the 
connections between these factors have to be kept in mind (cf. Geringer/Herbert 
1989, p.240f). 
 
Mechanisms of control 
 
Previous studies assumed that the main factor for securing control in international 
joint ventures is a full or majority ownership and a majority of votes in the board of 
directors (which in turn should also highly depend on the share of ownership) (cf. 
Stopford/ Wells 1972, p.99; Behrman 1970, p.2; Friedman/Beguin 1971, p 365; 
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Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.238). However, recent research showed, that control is 
not necessarily determined by ownership alone (cf. Schaan 1983, p.204; 
Schaan/Beamish 1988, p.288; Geringer/Herbert 1989, p. 38; Killing 1983, p.24-28; 
Child/Yan 1999, p.11). Rather, a parent can use a great variety of mechanisms to 
exercise control in a joint venture: veto rights, locating own personnel in key posi-
tions, contractual arrangements regarding technology (e.g. licensing) or manage-
ment (consulting agreement), reporting structure, monitoring systems and a broad 
range of informal mechanisms. Monitoring systems can range from autocratic (in-
dividual, centralized control) to democratic (local control by socialisation). If per-
formance of subsidiaries cannot be easily monitored, firms can use rewards and 
incentives to align employee’s interests with their own objectives (cf. Gatig-
non/Anderson 1988, p.310). Firms can also use technological or managerial 
strength to influence the operation of the venture (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.6). Con-
tracts, which devise certain structures of ownership, represent a further possible 
type of mechanism (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, p. 238). 
 
Staffing policy in particular can be a crucial strategic mechanism for a parent (cf. 
Pucik 1988, p.489).  Many joint ventures have general managers as well as heads of 
department, which are recruited from the parent’s staff. These managers are some-
times on the payroll of their parent or are rewarded in a different way. But even, if 
this is not the case, they usually act according to the interest of their parent, because 
they expect to be rewarded by future advancement in their home company (cf. Kill-
ing 1983, p.8-11). Hence, a parent can influence the distribution of control of a joint 
venture by influencing the appointment of management key-positions. The position 
of the general manager in particular has a great influence on the activities of the 
joint venture, because he is responsible managing the venture as well as maintain-
ing relationships between the parents (cf. Schaan/Beamish 1988, p.279f). Selection, 
training, assessment and remuneration of the general manager influences not only 
the joint venture but also the relation between parents (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, 
p. 241). Within the joint venture board of directors the problem of shared mana-
gerial responsibilities becomes especially apparent. The board is staffed with mem-
bers of either parent and here is the place where conflicts between the parents are 
disputed in an open manner (cf. Killing 1983, S.9). 
 
Schaan (1983) and Schaan and Beamish (1988) distinguishe positive and negative 
control mechanisms. Positive control mechanisms are employed to effectuate a cer-
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tain behavior of the venture, whereas negative mechanisms are employed to inhibit 
certain activities or decisions. Table 3.1 lists an excerpt of Schaan’s classification 
of mechanisms. 
 
Table 3.1: Positive and negative control mechanisms according to Schaan 
 
                          Positive 
 
 
                         Negative 
 
• Informal mechanisms 
• Staffing 
• Participation in planning process 
• Reporting relationships 
• Training programs 
• Incentives 
 
 
• Formal agreements 
• Board of directors 
• Approval by parents 
• Executive committee 
Sources: Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.235; Schaan/Beamish1988, p.29 
 
Geringer and Herbert (1989) propose a classification of control mechanisms as con-
text-orientated, content-orientated or process-orientated. Context-orientated me-
chanisms aim at the creation of an organizational environment, which shall support 
the fulfillment of the parent’s objectives. Content-orientated mechanisms are of 
more direct nature. They largely correspond to the negative mechanisms of 
Schaan’s classification. Process-orientated mechanisms effectuate control by shap-
ing structures or processes of a joint venture, for instance the reporting system. 
 
Extent of control 
 
A second dimension is the parent’s extent of control over the actions international 
joint ventures. In various studies about the extent of control in joint ventures, the 
parent’s share of ownership is used as a proxy to measure their respective extent of 
control over the activities of the venture (cf. Anderson/Gatignon 1986; Gatig-
non/Anderson 1988; Fagre/Wells 1982; Hu/Chen 1993; Blodgett 1991). Other stu-
dies tried to measure control more directly by examining the structure of decision-
making in various areas of joint venture activity. They found no direct correlation 
between ownership patterns and control extent, however (cf. Geringer/Herbert 
1989, p.238).  Due to the fact that the ratio of board membership generally corre-
lates with the ratio of ownership, the relative proportion of capital share of a partner 
is an indicator of its formal voting right. But joint ventures rather depend on good-
will and co-operation instead of enforcement by voting, so these rights are more 
virtual in nature (cf. Killing 1983, p. 21). A firm can have a dominant influence on 
joint venture behavior, even when the ownership is equally shared between part-
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ners. Likewise, joint ventures with unbalanced ownership and equally shared con-
trol exist (cf. Killing 1983, p.18). Even a partner with a minority ownership can 
exert dominant control due to factors like contractual arrangements, provision of 
non-transferable knowhow and a legal status as a governmental institution (cf. Ga-
tignon/Anderson, 1988, p.313). An important contribution of these studies was the 
conceptualization of control as a continuous variable, “rather than merely an abso-
lute, dichotomous variable representing parents' exercise of either total control or 
no control” (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.240). 
 
Child and Yan (1999) point out, that for the study of joint ventures it is important to 
distinguish between extent of control and the mechanisms, which are employed to 
exercise control (for instance ratio of board membership and appointment of man-
agement positions). Mechanisms are not the underlying reason for the ability of a 
parent to influence the behavior of the joint venture. Rather mechanisms represent 
more or less efficient methods to enforce a parent’s interests. 
 
Figure 3.1: Dominant partner joint venture 
 
Source:according to Killing 1983, p.17 
 
To measure the influence of parents, Killing (1983, p.15) carried out a survey 
amongst parent’s heads of department and joint venture general managers. They 
were asked to rate the influence of their parent in nine categories of joint venture 
activity: pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, manufacturing, 
quality control, replacement of managers, sales targets, cost budgeting and capital 
expenditures. Based on their assessment each joint venture was classified as domi-
nant parent joint venture (ventures where only one parent plays an important role 
with regard to decision-making) (cf. Figure 3.1), shared management joint venture 
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(where both or all partners play an important role) (figure 3.2) or as independent 
joint ventures (where the joint venture general manager primarily decides indepen-
dent from the parents) (cf. Geringer/Herbert 1989, p.239).  
The main characteristic of a dominant partner joint venture is the fact, that it is ma-
naged by the dominant parent like a wholly owned subsidiary. The board of direc-
tors has only minor influence, although both parents appoint members to it. Manag-
ers from the dominant parent make all strategic and operational decisions. The oth-
er parent may as well provide substantial capital or non-capital resources, but he 
does not play an active role in decision-making, because he has trust in the mana-
gerial capabilities of the dominant partner (cf. Killing 1983, p.16-17). 
 
Figure 3.2: Shared management joint venture 
 
Source: according to Killing 1983, p.21 
 
In shared management joint ventures both parents play an active role in decision-
making. The mechanisms they employ to exercise control can vary and each parent 
might use different types of mechanisms. However both or all parents decide on 
issues of all areas of joint venture activity (cf. Figure 3.2). The board of directors 
may have much more influence compared to a dominant parent joint venture. Also 
it is much more likely, that key executive positions are appointed by both or all 
parents (cf. Killing 1983, p.20). In independent joint ventures the joint venture gen-
eral manager has much more freedom to make autonomous decisions. Killing clas-
sified joint ventures, where the general manager has the freedom to decide on six of 
nine categories independently, as independent joint ventures (cf. Killing 1983, 
p.22). 
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Focus of control 
 
A third dimension is the focus of control. Schaan (1983) questioned the assumption 
that parents generally seek to control the whole joint venture, instead of concentrat-
ing on certain activities or processes, which are considered to be vital for accom-
plishment of strategic objectives of either the joint venture or the parent. Empirical 
evidence for this view was found in his study of ten international joint ventures in 
Mexico and in Geringers’ (1986) study of ninety joint ventures in developed coun-
tries. A possible explanation for this behavior is the fact, that exercising control 
involves costly measures, which parents may seek to avoid. Rather than maximiz-
ing control firms should seek for the most efficient control. As a consequence 
Schaan defined control as the process by which a parent secures, that the joint ven-
ture is managed according to its interests and objectives.  
 
Based on the idea of a control focus Geringer and Herbert (1989) propose the con-
cept of split control joint ventures as an addition to Killing‘s classification. In a 
split control joint venture a parent only seeks dominant control over certain aspects 
of joint venture activity. It can be distinguished from dominant partner joint ven-
tures and shared partner joint ventures by the fact, that each partner has dominant 
control over its own firm-specific advantages (cf. Choi/Beamish 2004, p.64). 
 
  
23 
4. Central and Eastern Europe 
 
4.1. Transition process and accession to the European Union 
 
4.1.1 Upheaval, reorientation and transformation 
 
Between 1989 and 1991 the countries of Eastern Europe succeeded in abolishing 
their communist regimes, which had been in charge several decades. Although ac-
tivities of transformation were evident since the eighties, the sudden upheaval of 
the political system came as a surprise (cf. Häupl 2010, p.17). The change of sys-
tem was characterized by a series of peaceful revolutions, which raised expectations 
of better living conditions and a democratic future (cf. Stankovsky 1994, p.2). The 
pattern of upheaval was similar in many countries. After the year 1989 the com-
munist governments gradually lost control over their sovereign territory. Student 
protests and mass demonstrations triggered a rapid acceleration of internal changes. 
While Glasnost and Perestroika in the former Soviet Union paved the way for a 
system change, Austria’s neighbors in particular were able to make use of the newly 
attained freedom to shape their future. 
 
From an economic viewpoint the challenge was to facilitate the transition from a 
system of state owned property to a system with private property. Several ways of 
institutional reconfiguration were discussed. In general the prevailing opinion was 
that a system of free capitalism following the example of Great Britain and the 
United States should be preferred to a social market economy in the style of Ger-
many or Austria. The first phase of the transition process was not without trouble: 
large-scale unemployment, inflation and rising crime rates were caused by the ab-
rupt opening to western markets (cf. Meyer, 1998, p.13). In the first years after the 
transition gross national product fell between 20 and 30 per cent on average.  
The joy caused by the newly gained freedom quickly diminished and gave way to 
nostalgia and desire for security and predictability of life. Therefore at an early 
stage the CEE countries tried to intensify their relations with Western Europe and 
the European Union (cf. Niemann 2005, p.96-97). 
 
4.1.2. Harmonization with the European Union 
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Even before plans to enlarge the community existed, the EU supported the CEE1
 
  
countries in their struggle for transformation from the year 1989 onwards. The main 
part of this program was the PHARE-project (Poland Hungry Assistance for the 
Reconstruction of the Economy), which was successively undertaken in all Eastern 
European countries. Shortly after that, the EU implemented several steps for inte-
gration. At an early point with the declaration of the European Agreement (EA) a 
trade agreement with the CEE countries was arranged. In 1993 in Copenhagen the 
European Council announced the Eastern European expansion as official policy (cf. 
Niemann 2005, p.97).  
In order to get admitted to the European Union every country had to fulfill several 
criteria: intuitional stability to guarantee democracy and constitutional legality, pro-
tection of human rights and the rights of minorities, a functioning market economy 
with the ability to compete within the European economic region and commitment 
to the obligations of the membership (cf. Brunn 2002, p.295-296). These criteria for 
accession meant high requirements for the candidates. The European Union de-
manded radical reconstruction of the political, economic and institutional system 
within a few years. The process of accession - the Eastern European expansion of 
the EU – took about ten years. 
 
Table 4.1: Time line of the transformation process in CEE 
 
 
1989 Fall of the Berlin wall (November 09) 
1990 German reunification (October 03) 
1991 Collapse of the USSR, abolishment of the Warsaw Pact 
1993 
European Council in Copenhagen: Official invitation to CEE countries to join 
the EU (June 22) 
2004 fifth EU-expansion (EU-25) (Mai 01) 
2007 completion of fifth EU-expansion (EU-27) 
 
Source: Breuss 2010, S. 117 
 
After a series of negotiations the accession of 10 members took place on Mai 01 
2004. The former fifteen EU countries were joined by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus and Slovenia to 
form the EU-25 (cf. Booker 2007, p.16). Following the fifth and largest EU expan-
                                                 
1 CEE: Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia), 
Southern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
Serbia and CIS-Countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) 
25 
sion, in January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became new EU member states (cf. 
Breuss 2010, p.118-119). Since the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 Central and 
Eastern Europe is part of an impressive success story. In the last twenty years the 
region has successfully managed to move from a centrally planned economy to a 
functioning market economy and started to catch up with Western Europe (cf. Step-
ic 2010, p.41). 
 
4.2. Austria’s economy after the fall of the iron curtain 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
After the end of communism and the fall of the iron curtain the geopolitical situa-
tion in Europe had radically changed. The political and economic systems in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe have undergone a systematic transformation and the ongo-
ing European integration reached an entire new dimension. But not only for the 
CEE countries themselves, but also for Austria the consequences of the change 
were formidable. After decades of residing on the verge of the economic landscape, 
with a more or less tight border in the east, this isolation gradually liquidated. Since 
1989 trade relations between Austria and the CEE countries expanded (cf. Ederer 
2010, p. 53). An important characteristic of this development was the fact, that 
Austria took benefit from the market opening to a much higher degree than the oth-
er Western European countries. The CEE countries represented a large dynamic 
market and Austria took advantage of its geographical proximity and its familiarity 
with the region. The share of Austrian exports to the Region increased from 9.8% in 
1989 to 23.8% in 2008 (Ragacs/Vondra 2009, p. 68-69).  The relationship of Aus-
tria with the countries in the CEE region is especially close, because of historical 
tradition and numerous personal relations.  Many Austrian firms have a profound 
knowledge of their neighbors and maintain good contacts with enterprises in these 
countries. Also many Austrian citizens have origins in Eastern Europe and are fa-
miliar with the language and mentality in the region. The high level of knowledge 
about the region is advantageous for coordination of business and constitutes a 
competitive advantage for Austrian firms. Furthermore, the CEE countries offer 
considerable advantages as a production location for Austrian firms. Saving costs 
by outsourcing certain elements of the value creation chain to CEE countries can 
enhance competitiveness on international markets also. 
 
4.2.2 Austrian foreign direct investment in CEE 
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Austrians involvement in the Region is even more impressive with regard to for-
eign direct investment. After the fall of the iron curtain Austria became one of the 
major sources of foreign direct investment in the CEE region. More than twenty per 
cent of all foreign direct investment projects between 1989 and 1994 in the region 
came from Austria.  
Vice versa the Eastern European states became the most important target country 
for Austrian investors as well. This helped to improve the traditional low foreign 
direct investment activities of Austria (Ragacs/Vondra 2009, p.69). For no other 
country the CEE region was of comparable importance not even for neighboring 
countries like Finland and Turkey. The overall outward direct investment stock of 
Austria in the CEE region increased from almost zero to US$3 billion in 1994. 
Additionally, many multinational corporations founded headquarters in Vienna in 
the early nineties, and started to invest in CEE markets from here (Meyer 1998, 
p.36). The capital Vienna has a leading position as a national control center. It pro-
vides advantageous conditions for business with a dynamic economic environment 
and economies of agglomeration, exceptional infrastructure and a superior cultural 
life. Based on its geographical closeness Vienna is a superior location to supply 
markets in Central Eastern Europe (cf. Stankovsky/Wolfmayr-Schnitzer 1996, p.50-
52). 
 
Table 4.2: Austrian FDI stocks, Growth and Shares in CEE and Germany 
 
FDI stock 
(EUR million) 
Period averages 
 
FDI growth 
% 
 
 
FDI in % of 
Total FDI 
Period averages 
 
Region 
1990-
1998 
1999-
2007  
1990-
1998 
1999-
2007  
1990-
1998 
1999-
2007 
CEE1             2.290 21.432  970 832  25 39 
Germany                     1.564 7.638  159 438  20 16 
Poland                      139 2.546  3.050 518  1 5 
Slovakia                       170 2.044  45.400 658  2 4 
Slovenia                       190 1.115  790 276  2 2 
Czech Republic                      541 4.047  11.020 489  5 8 
Hungary 1,095 3.797  396 344  13 8 
Russia 35 1.256  -156 3.975  0 2 
Notes: 1  Al, By, Ba, Bg, Hr, Cz, Ee, Hu, Lv, Lt, Mk, Md, Me, Pl, Ro, Ru, Rs, Sk, Sl, Ua 
Source: Ragacs/Vondra 2009, S.70 
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Table 4.2 shows indicators of region specific foreign direct investment of Austria. 
By the end of year 1999 approximately thirty per cent of all Austrian foreign direct 
investment stock were placed in the CEE region and even forty per cent of foreign 
direct investment outward flows. The economic connections were most intense with 
the neighbor coutnries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia 
and particularly with Hungary. In 1994 17% of all Austrian direct foreign invest-
ments were placed in Hungary (cf. Meyer 1998, p.36). After 1999 the increase in 
foreign direct investment from Austria was slower but still strong. Yet by the mid 
of the nineties growth started to decrease, because initial growth rates were too ex-
aggerated and competitors from other countries gradually moved into the region 
and diminished the first-mover advantage of Austrian firms. In addition, after 2009 
Austria’s foreign direct outflows broke down as a result of the economic crisis. 
However if the intensification of economic collaboration due to the expansion of 
the European Union continues, Austrian firms should hold their strong market posi-
tion. 
 
4.3. Country descriptions 
 
4.3.1. Poland 
 
Poland experienced a modernization push in the last two decades, which entirely 
changed state and society. A peculiarity of Poland inside the territory of Soviet he-
gemony was the strong influence of the Catholic Church on society and the fact, 
that collectivization of agriculture by force was abandoned in 1956. Till the end of 
the People’s Republic 75% agricultural area were in private hands. Due to the 
shock treatment of finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz Poland was the first of the 
former communist countries to return to positive economic growth and by the mid 
nineties attracted the main stream of foreign direct investment from the West to 
former COMECON states (cf. Meyer, 1998, p. 14; Zimmer/Matthes 2010, p.210-
211).The countries’ orientation towards the Western hemisphere fosters Poland’s 
political, economical and societal consolidation (cf. Witkowska 1999, p. 408). Pol-
and’s economic structure reflects the profound improvements.  65% of gross value 
creation occurs in service industries and only 21% in manufacturing, 6% in con-
struction and 4% in agriculture (cf. Aßländer et al. 2004, p. 269-270). Almost se-
venty percent of gross value creation occur in the private sector, which occupies 
nearly seventy five percent of employees. Due to the international financial and 
economical crisis growth rate decreased from 6.8% in 2007 to 5.0% in 2008. Pol-
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and mastered the global crisis comparably well and was the only EU member to 
achieve positive growth rates in 2009. 
 
4.3.2. Czech Republic 
 
Czech Republic is a country with long industrial tradition, which goes back to the 
prewar time. Not long after the fall of the iron curtain the Czech Republic separated 
from Slovakia as a result of differences between political cultures, economic and 
social crisis and incited nationalism (cf. Vodicka 2010, p.275). Contrary to the 
Czech Republic, privatization and economic reforms were declined in Slovakia (cf. 
Klima 2005, S.135-136; Vodicka 2010, p.276). But also political culture in the 
Czech Republic is not unaffected by the communist regime, since it was among 
those countries where the system of centralized planning had been implemented 
most comprehensively (cf. Meyer 1998, p.15). Since 1990, the state retreats from 
economic activities. For means of privatization of big state owned enterprises a 
voucher scheme was implemented, whereas smaller firms were sold directly to in-
terested parties. (cf. Vodicka 2010, p. 299). Two thirds of foreign trade is con-
ducted with EU countries currently. Mainly machinery, vehicles and electric devic-
es are exported from the Czech Republic. 
35% of gross value creation occurs in manufacturing, 17% in trade, 19% in busi-
ness-related and financial services, 8% in transport and communication, 7% in con-
struction and 5% in agriculture. After years with growth rates above 6.0%, due to 
the global financial and economic crisis growth decreased to a rate of 2.5% in 2008. 
As a highly export oriented economy the Czech Republic suffered to a high grade 
from the breakdown of global demand. 
 
4.3.3. Slovakia 
 
Slovakia exists since 1993 as independent state. A profound reversal in the political 
system resulted from the change of government in 1993. Governments after the 
Meciar era have successfully pursued the integration of Slovakia in Western struc-
tures. Favorable conditions attracting foreign capital were created.  Economically 
underdeveloped regions in the east and south of the country profited by substantial 
funds of the European Union (cf. Rüdiger Kipke 2010, p.317). After a phase with 
moderate growth, economic development in recent years was positive and currently 
Slovakia’s economy is very dynamic. Inward flow of foreign capital is high, be-
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cause of well-educated work force, low wages, favorable geographic location and 
business friendly conditions.  
 
4.3.4. Hungary 
 
After the first free elections in 1990, gradually transformation of the centrally 
planned economy according to principles of a market economy took place. Small 
private businesses existed in Hungary even before the fall of the iron curtain be-
cause elements of a free market were incorporated in the system of goulash com-
munism (cf. Meyer 1998, p.16). A high priority given to foreign capital in the pri-
vatization process attracted investors. As a result Hungary has been the leading 
destination for investors in the early years of transition, with almost half of all di-
rect foreign investment inflows into the CEE region until 1993 (cf. Meyer 1998, 
p.32). 
Because of a lack of resources the country relies on raw material imports for its fast 
growing economic sectors. More than half of the production in the primary sector 
and two thirds of the production in manufacturing is exported. Hungary’s economy 
was lacking growth even before the financial crisis. Because debt financed econom-
ic stimulus packages couldn’t been implemented, other economic incentives had to 
be found. 
In Hungary the style of communication is indirect. Hungarians behave rather extra-
verted in verbal and non-verbal communication and rather resemble Southern Eu-
ropeans in this regard (cf. Körösényi et al 2010, p.341).   
 
4.3.5. Slovenia 
 
Even before it became independent, Slovenia was economically the most progres-
sive republic of former Yugoslavia. The average income exceeds not only that of 
other CEE countries, but that of Greece and Portugal. Since 1991 Slovenia is an 
independent country. The transition to democracy was smooth and without political 
conflict. In 1990 privatization started and in 2007 the telecommunication sector was 
privatized. The main areas of economic activity in Slovenia are machinery, metal 
processing, electric devices and chemicals. The geographic location with Italy, 
Austria, Hungary and Croatia as neighbors creates favorable trade connections and 
economic relations. 
Slovenia is an internationally recognized country with a growing economy. Its tran-
sition process can be regarded as completed (cf. Luksic 2010, p.729-730). 
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5. Cultural Differences and Management 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
... the more similar we get,  
the more importance we attach to differences … 
Alexis de Toquevilles 
 
While institutional and legal frameworks in the course of international harmoniza-
tion tend to equalize, the variety of languages and even more of different cultures is 
still vast. Cultural differences still matter despite of cultural assimilation. In addi-
tion, differences between cultural traditions, languages and identities exist not only 
on a national level, but within every area of social life (cf. Hartnack 2005, p.50). 
Furthermore cultural boundaries are often not congruent with the perimeter of a 
national territory (cf. Apfelthaler 1999, p.10-11; Krystek/Minke 1990, p.30). 
 
Over and above it is important to show respect for other cultures and to be open 
minded enough to question one’s own attitudes and behavior. A corporate culture 
should not be prescribed compulsory without critical reflection. In fact one should 
ask critical questions like: to what extent and in which form is cultural adjustment 
necessary from a strategic viewpoint? Which potentials and synergies will be de-
stroyed or impaired by a too rigid unilateral assimilation? With these questions in 
mind it is much easier to realize assets and drawbacks of actions related to culture 
and to decide accordingly (cf. Bürger 2005, p.11; Kanter 2008, p.69; Krys-
tek/Minke 1990, p.34). Necessary knowledge about the differences between one’s 
own and other cultures can be gathered with the help of cultural comparative re-
search (cf. Fu et al 2004, p.301). 
 
5.2. Definition and conceptualization  
 
Anybody who wishes to investigate cultural phenomena is confronted with a vast 
number of publications (cf. Probst/Rühling 1999, p.24). A summary of the concept 
of culture is difficult. It is one of the most frequent discussed terms in social 
sciences and a ubiquitous vocable of the modern age. Many authors agree with the 
conclusion, that culture is one of the most complex linguistic concepts (cf. Jenks 
1993, p.35; Puck et al 2007, p.28) and one of the most important factors in econom-
ical and ethical decisions (cf. Singhapakdi et at 1994, p.66). The scientific defini-
tion of the term culture is general different from the use of the term culture in col-
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loquial language. Table 5.1 shows a compilation of several definitions of the term 
culture.  
 
Table 5.1: Different definitions of the term culture  
 
Author Definition 
 
Taylor (1871) 
 
That complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, 
art, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society” 
 
 
Herskovits 
(1948) 
 
 
The man-made part of the human environment” 
 
Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn 
(1952) 
 
 
Transmitted patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic 
systems that shape behavior 
 
Becker & Geer 
(1970) 
 
 
Set of common understandings expressed in language 
 
Van Maanen & 
Schein (1979) 
 
 
Values, beliefs and expectations that members come to 
share 
 
Hill (2002) 
 
A system of values and norms that are shared among a 
group of people and that when taken together constitute a 
design for living 
 
 
Louis (1983) 
 
Three aspects: (1) content (meaning and interpretation) 
(2) peculiar t (3) a group 
 
 
Hall & Hall 
(1987) 
 
 
Primarily a system for creating, sending, storing and 
processing information 
 
Harris & Moran 
(1987) 
 
A distinctly human capacity for adapting to circums-
tances and transmitting this coping skill and knowledge 
to subsequent generations 
 
 
Jenks (1993) 
 
Kultur ist (1) ein System geteilter Bedeutungen, das 
Menschen hilft, den Ereignissen und Gegenständen ihres 
Lebens Sinn zu verleihen; (2) relativ, d.h.., es gibt keine 
absolute, an der einer Kultur messbar wäre. Es gibt kein 
„besser“ oder „schlechter“, sondern nur ein „anders“ im 
Kontext von Kulturen; (3) gelernt, d.h. nicht durch Ver-
erbung determiniert, sondern von der Umgebung gelernt; 
(4) gruppenbezogen, also ein kollektives Phänomen 
 
 
Hoecklin (1995) 
 
Culture as (a) general state of mind (b) state of intellec-
tual/moral development in society (c) collective body of 
arts and intellectual work (d) the whole way of life of a 
people 
 
 
Thomas (1999) 
 
Kultur ein universelles, für eine Gesellschaft, Organisati-
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on und Gruppe aber sehr typisches Orientierungssystem. 
Dieses Orientierungssystem wird aus spezifischen Sym-
bolen gebildet und in der jeweiligen Gesellschaft usw. 
tradiert. Es beeinflusst das Wahrnehmen, Denken, Wer-
ten und Handeln aller ihrer Mietglieder und definiert 
somit deren Zugehörigkeit zur Gesellschaft 
 
 
Bürger (2005) 
 
Kultur ist als Orientierungssystem zu verstehen, das ein 
Mensch im Laufe seiner Sozialisation erlernt. Dieses 
System ermöglicht es uns, Ereignissen in unserer Umge-
bung einen Sinn bzw. eine bestimmte Bedeutung zuzu-
weisen 
 
 
Perlitz (1995) 
 
Kultur ist ein System, nach dem sich die Menschen rich-
ten und ihre Verhaltensregeln unterordnen 
 
 
Hofstede (2006) 
 
(…) jeder Mensch trägt in seinem Inneren Muster des 
Denkens, Fühlens und potentiellen Handelns, die er ein 
Leben lang erlernt hat. Ein Teil davon wurde in der frü-
hen Kindheit erworben, denn in dieser Zeit ist der 
Mensch am empfänglichsten für Lern- und Assimilati-
onsprozesse 
 
 
Sources: Apfelthaler 1999, p.30-31; Bürger 2005, p.13-14;  
Heinen/Dill 1986, p.207; Perlitz 1995.p.303; Hofstede 2006, p.2 
 
Cultures can be found on all levels and areas of society. They are classified as fami-
ly cultures, company cultures, business cultures, national cultures etc. The smaller 
the cultural sector under observation the more specific answers are possible. Con-
trary, with increasing size only general statements are possible (cf. Bürger 2005, 
p.13-16).  Several authors tried to determine levels and views, by which differences 
between cultures can be assessed. Following Kammel/Teichelmann (1994) and 
Bleicher (1990) the concept of culture can be examined on a country level (national 
culture) and on an organizational level (corporate culture) (cf. Kam-
mel/Teichelmann 1994, p.11-12; Bleicher 1990, p.84-85).    
The concept national culture deals with cultural attitudes and norms of behavior in 
a social field, which are learned and passed on by the members of a cultural area 
from childhood on (cf. Dürfler 1992, p.1207). If cultural differences of two nations 
are discussed, they refer to a kind of average of culture, from which the individual 
members deviate to a greater or lesser extent. One cannot expect an individual 
member of a culture to be in agreement with the respective norms and habits of that 
culture. Only probabilities of encountering a certain behavior in a specific culture 
exist (cf. Bürger 2005, p.13-16).  
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The concept of firm level culture found its way into the management literature at 
the beginning of the eighties as a result of the competition between the US and Ja-
pan and was termed „organizational culture“ or „corporate culture“. Following 
Schein (1985) organizational culture is „ (…) a pattern of basic assumptions – in-
vented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its prob-
lems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems“ (cf. Frese/Blies 2002, 
p.228). In the German-speaking realm the definition of Dill (1990) is frequently 
cited: „Unter einer Unternehmenskultur wird eine Grundgesamtheit gemeinsamer 
Werte, Normen und Einstellungen verstanden, welche die Entscheidungen, die 
Handlungen und das Verhalten der Organisationsmitglieder prägen. Die gemeinsa-
men Werte, Normen und Einstellungen stellen die unternehmenskulturellen Basis-
elemente dar. Diese werden durch organisationelle Handlungsweisen, Symbole und 
symbolische Handlungen verkörpert und konkretisiert“ (cf. Dürfler/Jöstingmeier 
2008, p.257). 
 
Managers, who are interested in the influence of national culture on business doing, 
focus on the concept of business culture (cf. Tipuric et al 2007, p.152). Business 
culture describes norms, attitudes and beliefs related to business doing of a society 
and defines a proper and acceptable way of doing business in a specific culture (cf. 
Cullen/Praveen Parboteeah 2005, p.52).  A typical question, which arises frequently 
in international management, is whether the influence of the national culture is 
stronger than the influence of corporate/organizational culture or vice versa (cf. 
Tipuric et al 2007, p.152). Several studies found that in many countries the differ-
ences between employees with different cultural background in the same company 
are by far greater than the differences between employees of different national en-
terprises. This is a clear indicator that national or business culture is much more 
influential than corporate culture. Hofstede also believes that national culture has a 
greater impact on the behavior of employees than corporate culture (cf. Miroshnik 
2002, p.537). 
 
5.3. Dimensions of national culture  
 
Many experts dealt with the problem of defining dimensions of national cultures. In 
the first half of the 20th century social anthropology developed the thesis, that all 
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societies, whether modern or traditional, are confronted with the same fundamental 
problems, with only differing answers. By means of theoretical consideration and 
statistical research social scientists tried to find out, which problems are common to 
all societies. In the year 1954 two American scientists, the sociologist Alex Inkeles 
and the psychologist Daniel Levinson, carried out an extensive survey of the Eng-
lish literature on the subject of national culture. They were convinced that the fol-
lowing points should be considered as important fundamental problems common to 
all societies: (1) relation towards authority, (2) the relationship between individual 
and society and the perception of masculinity and femininity by individuals and (3) 
the way of dealing with conflicts, including controlling of one’s aggressions and 
expression of feelings (cf. Hofstede 2006, p.28). 
 
5.3.1. Edward T. Hall - cultural complexity 
 
Complexity of a culture is the amount of inhered and acquired principles and con-
text-dependent information, which define a certain situation or condition of social 
life. In every culture implied, vague or ambiguous rules are present in social rela-
tionships and in interpersonal communication. Cultures vary with regard to the way 
of dealing with context-dependent information. The greater the extent of context-
dependent information, which is necessary to understand a social situation, the 
more complex a culture is. With increasing complexity of a culture the difficulties 
of an outsider to assess the meaning of situation and to correctly interpret social 
circumstances rise. Countries can range high or low on cultural complexity, accord-
ing to the amount of context-dependent information which is necessary to under-
stand daily life. 
 
The American anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1977) studied the subject of informa-
tion density in a situational context. During his first visits of Japan „he found him-
self involved in a series of events that left him confused and disoriented“ (cf. Sclavi 
2008, p.162). He was convinced that every information in interpersonal communi-
cation between two people is a carrier of meaning and that this circumstance is the 
actual reason for misunderstanding between two parties, who belong to different 
cultures. According to his book „Beyond Culture“, there are two groups of cul-
tures: high-context and low-context cultures (cf. Hall 1977, p.28).  
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Examples of low-context cultures are for instance the US, Germany and Switzer-
land. They are characterized by individualistic values, a direct manner of speech, 
which refers to the person speaking, and first and foremost a way of communica-
tion, which is based mainly on words. The speaker tries to make a good impression 
of himself and not to lose his face in the conversation. The message is explicitly 
formulated in a way that the recipient can easily decode its meaning without the 
need of interpretation. High-context communication is typical of East-Asian and 
Arabic countries and the Mediterranean region. In this way of communication ver-
bal as well as non-verbal signals play a vital role. Contrary to low-context cultures 
the message not the speaker plays a decisive role. The recipient has to interpret the 
meaning of the message. High-context communication refers to connections, which 
are not mentioned explicitly, like social norms, roles, status and the relationship of 
the communicating individuals. The manner of communication is indirect and the 
message is not formulated explicitly (cf. Hall 1977, p.57). 
 
5.3.2. Cultural dimensions according to Trompenaars 
 
The Dutch scientist Trompenaars (1993) studied cultural differences between dif-
ferent markets and developed a model with 5 cultural dimensions. Each of the di-
mensions refers to a pattern of two contradicting behaviors. Furthermore, he de-
fined two preconditions, which he thought to be necessary to utilize the possible 
advantages of cultural difference: (1) People should develop greater awareness of 
the cultural differences in order to be able to understand their own behavior. “(…) 
you can only understand yourself through others” (cf. Lloyd/Trompenaars 1993, 
p.17). (2) People should have more respect for different cultures, to enhance under-
standing of different logics. 
With the help of his model Trompenaars found, that the citizens of the US and Aus-
tralia belong to the group of universalists on the first dimension, because they at-
tach more importance to compliance with rules, whereas Europe is basically charac-
terized by particularism, which accounts more for social relations and specifics of a 
situation in decisions. The second dimension describes whether or not emotions are 
shown in business relations and interpersonal communication. Americans tend to 
show their emotions in private life, but hide emotions in business situations. By 
contrast in Italy and generally in the Mediterranean region it is common to express 
emotions in business life (cf. Gallagher 1996, S.229). The third dimension concerns 
the way the way a person is assigned social status, whether by descent or indivi-
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dually by consideration of a person’s achievements. Studies show, that particularly 
people in the US and Australia are performance-oriented, while for instance in Ve-
nezuela, Indonesia or China a person’s status is primarily acquired by descent (cf. 
Grant 2008, p.382). The forth cultural dimension deals with perception of time and 
the last dimension analyses how people think about their influence on their envi-
ronment.  In a survey managers from different countries were asked if they believe, 
that the things that happen to their lives are mainly influenced by themselves or not; 
thus to what extent they are able to control their own life. 89 per cent of American 
managers hold that the circumstances of their life are self-determined, further 83 
per cent of Germans and 69 per cent of Japanese. By contrast only 31 per cent of 
Chinese Managers think that they influence their life to a great extent (cf. Gallagher 
1996, p.230). 
 
5.3.3. Cultural dimensions according to  the GLOBE-study  
 
At the beginning of the nineties the American scientist Robert J. House initiated the 
research program Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
Research Program (GLOBE-Study). The aim of the study was to shed a light on the 
interrelations between corporate and business culture on the one hand and man-
agement on the other hand (cf. Wilson 2005, p.558; House et al 2004, p.11-12). The 
project comprised a survey among 17.000 managers from 61 countries in three dif-
ferent industries: telecommunication, food industry and financial services (cf. 
House et al 2002, p.3; Wilson 2005, p.559). „Dabei wurde der Frage nachgegangen, 
wie viel Wert beispielsweise auf Aspekte wie Zukunftsorientierung (vorausschau-
endes Planen und Investieren) gelegt wird, auf Leistungs- und Humanorientierung 
(Fairness, Fürsorge, Höflichkeit), auf ungleichmäßige Machtverteilung (Machtdis-
tanz) oder darauf wie zum Beispiel Unsicherheiten durch soziale Kontrollinstanzen 
vermieden werden“ (cf. Braun 2008, p.36). Further, respondents were asked what 
would characterize a superior manager in their opinion. 
 
Nine cultural dimensions have been found, which should make it possible to diffe-
rentiate between various societies and organizations. Several dimensions of the 
study are nearly identical with the dimensions of Hofstede, as will be described in 
chapter 3.4., but there are also others, which cover aspects not included in Hofs-
tede’s model (cf. House et al 2004, p.11-13). The dimensions are: uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, collectivism I: societal emphasis on collectivism, col-
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lectivism II: family collectivistic practices, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, 
future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation (cf. House et al 
2002, p.5-6) 
 
• Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as “the extent to which members of an 
organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social 
norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictabil-
ity of future events”. 
• Power Distance is “the degree to which members of an organization or 
society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared”. 
• Collectivism I: Societal Emphasis on Collectivism „reflects the degree to 
which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and 
reward collective distribution of resources and collective action”. 
• Collectivism II: Family Collectivistic Practices „reflects the degree to 
which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organ-
izations and families”. 
• Gender Egalitarianism is „the extent to which an organization or a so-
ciety minimizes gender role differences and gender discrimination“. 
• Assertiveness is „the degree to which individuals in organizations and 
societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social rela-
tionships”. 
• Future Orientation is „the degree to which individuals in organizations 
and societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, in-
vesting in the future, and delaying gratification”. 
• Performance Orientation „refers to the extent to which an organization 
or society encourages and rewards group members for performance im-
provement and excellence. This dimension includes the future oriented 
component of the dimension called Confucian Dynamism by Hofstede 
and Bond (1988)”. 
• Humane Orientation is „the degree to which individuals in organiza-
tions or societies encourage and reward individuals to being fair, al-
truistic, friendly, generous, caring and kind to others”. 
 
Although the GLOBE study is of high relevance, it is not without critique. The sur-
vey covers only three selected industries, which raises the question of applicability 
of the results on a broader cultural range. The study focused on respondents from 
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middle management to allow for comparability of country results. Generalization of 
results should be taken with care, because of differences in behavior patterns and 
societal norms. Internal cultural differences and subcultures for instance of the US, 
China and India have not sufficiently been accounted for (cf. Holzmüller 1995, 
p.111; Koopman et al 1999, p.517-518). However, the GLOBE-study is the most 
comprehensive study of comparative social research so far. The authors see it as a „ 
(…) consequence of stronger connections among different cultures“ (cf. House et al 
2002, p.1). In contrast to the study of Hofstede, which focuses on corporate culture 
and its influence, the GLOBE study is based on a survey among members of differ-
ent organizations, which might increase the generalizability of the results (cf. 
House et al 2002, p.3; Wilson 2005, p.559). 
 
5.4. Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions 
 
… At its root, culture is not an intellectual thing  
– it operates on an emotional not on an intellectual level.  
As such, I don’t believe that educational level  
impacts on sensitivities … 
 
Gert Hofstede (cf. Powell 2006, p.15) 
 
5.4.1. Introduction 
 
Understanding cultural differences can be a difficult task (cf. Lere/Portz 2005, 
p.62). After several years of research Gert Hofstede (1983; 1994) was given the 
opportunity to gather a large amount of information about the attitudes of people in 
countries all over the world. His study, in which he interviewed employees of IBM 
subsidiaries in 66 countries between 1967 and 1973, is considered the most impor-
tant cultural study so far (cf. Eckhardt 2002, p.89; 93-94; Puck et al 2004, p.28-29; 
Purohit/Simmers 2006, p.3; Mc Sweeney 2002, p.90), because of its extensive data 
pool, the incorporation of a great number of countries and its empirical foundation 
(cf. Puck et al 2004, p.29; Mc Sweeney 2002, p.90). According to Hofstede the 
work is „ (…) a paradigm shifting. The work was what made many business scho-
lars first question the universal applicability of some of the most common business 
models“ (cf. Eckhardt 2002, p.90; Carraher 2003, p.99). 
 
By means of statistical evaluation of the survey, problems common to all countries 
were identified, as well as corresponding country specific characteristics in the fol-
lowing areas: Social inequality including attitudes towards authority, relationships 
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between individuals and groups, definition of gender roles as well as their social 
and emotional impacts, attitudes towards uncertainty and aggression (cf. Hofstede 
2006, p.29; Hofstede 2001, p.30). These areas are astonishingly similar to the clas-
sification of fundamental cultural problems, which Inkeles and Levinson proposed 
twenty years earlier. 
 
The term culture is defined by Hofstede as the „collective programming of the mind 
which distinguish members of one human group from another“. Culture is a system 
of values, behavioral norms and believes which are acquired and collected by 
people in a social environment (cf. Hofstede 2006, p.47; Chui/Kwok 2008, p.88).  
 
Hofstedes model (1983; 1994) is a framework, which comprises five dimensions of 
national cultures: 
 
• Power Distance - PDI, 
• Individualism vs. Collectivism - IDV, 
• Masculinity vs. Femininity - MAS, 
• Uncertainty Avoidance - UAI, 
• Long term orientation or Confucian Dynamism - LTO. 
 
The fifth dimension Long term orientation was added by Hofstede and Michael 
Harris Bond from the Chinese University Hong Kong in 1991, as a result of a fol-
low-up survey  which they undertook in Southeast Asia (cf. Praxmarer 2009, p.619; 
Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-98, Hofstede 2006, p.37, Purohit/Simmers 2006, p.4).  
 
5.4.2. Characteristics of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
 
Power Distance – PDI  
 
Power distance (PDI) is defined as the degree to which the less powerful members 
of social institutions (for instance family, school or society) and organizations 
(firms) in a culture accept unequal distribution of power. Hofstede (1991) found 
that enterprises in countries with low power distance are more likely to employ a 
participative management style then enterprises from countries with high power 
distance. Managers from countries with high power distance attempt to exercise 
power without consideration of employees and will show this attitude in public (cf. 
Puck et al 2004, p.29). „Durch die hierarchische Ordnung und eng gefasste Rollen-
definition ist die Handlungsfreiheit in Gesellschaften mit hoher Machtdistanz ver-
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gleichsweise gering und ihre Einschränkung durch den Partner dürfte eher akzep-
tiert werden. In Gesellschaften mit geringer Machtdistanz ist die Handlungsfreiheit 
des Einzelnen vergleichsweise wichtig, so dass eine starke Einschränkung sich hier 
negativer auf das Vertrauen auswirken dürfte“ (cf. Praxmarer 2009, p.622-623). 
Table 5.2 compiles some major differences between societies with high and low 
power distance with reference to the work organization (cf. Hofstede 2006, p.59; 
Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-98). 
 
Table 5.2: Differences between societies with hghi and low power distance 
with reference to work organization 
                          Low PDI High PDI 
•  
• Subordinate-superior relations are prag-
matic 
 
•  
• Subordinate-superior relations polarized, 
often emotional 
• The ideal boss is the resourceful democrat 
 
 
• Subordinates expect to be consulted 
 
• The ideal boss is a well-meaning autocrat 
or good father 
 
• Subordinates expect to be told 
• Hierarchy in organizations means an ine-
quality of roles, established for conven-
ience 
• Hierarchy in organizations reflects the 
existential inequality between higher-ups 
and lower-downs 
• Managers rely on personal experience and 
on subordinates 
 
• Managers rely on superiors and formal  
rules 
 
 
Sources: Hofstede 2006, p.71; 76; Hofstede 2001, p.107-108 
 
Individualism vs. Collectivism – IDV 
 
Individualism vs. Collectivism refers to the degree to which people of a group be-
lieve that they should take care of members of their group or to which they expect 
other group members to look after them. Personal targets are important in individu-
alistic societies; confrontation is sought. Collectivistic societies strive for harmony 
and focus on group targets and mutual obligations (cf. Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-
98). In collectivistic societies individuals are integrated in strong groups from 
childhood on, which protect them throughout their whole live and demand loyalty 
in return (cf. Hofstede 2006, p.102-103). According to Triandis (1983) other people 
are seen as belonging either to the in-group or to the out-group. It is of particular 
importance in business relationships, whether a partner is regarded to belong to the 
in-group or to the out-group (cf. Triandis 1983, p.147). Members of collectivistic 
societies approach members of the in-group in a faithful and cooperative manner. 
By contrast, confidence in persons who belong to the out-group is low. Furthermore 
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it is comparably much more likely, that members of collectivistic societies behave 
opportunistically in business relations towards members of the out-group (cf. 
Huff/Kelley 2005, p.98-99). Table 5.3 compiles the main differences between col-
lectivistic and individualistic societies with reference to work organization. 
 
Table 5.3: Differences between collectivistic and individualistic societies 
with reference to work organization 
                            Low IDV  High IDV 
•  
• Employees act in the interest of their in 
group, not necessarily of themselves 
•  
• Employees are supposed to act as „eco-
nomic men“ 
 
• Employer-employee relationship is basi-
cally moral, like a family link 
 
• Employer-employee relationship is a busi-
ness deal in a „labor market“ 
• Management is management of groups 
 
• Management is management of individuals 
 
• In business, personal relationships prevail 
over task and company 
 
• In business, task and company prevail over 
personal relationships 
Sources: Hofstede 2006, p.139; Hofstede 2001, p.236 
 
Masculinity vs. Femininity – MAS  
 
According to Hofstede gender roles are much more pronounced in masculine socie-
ties (men are self concerned and profit oriented, woman take care of others and 
attach importance to relationships), whereas in feminine cultures the roles tend to 
converge or overlap. 
 
Table 5.4: Differences between masculine and feminine societies 
with reference to work organization 
   Low MAS       High MAS 
•  
• Resolution of conflicts through problem 
solving, compromise and negotiation. 
 
•  
• Resolution of conflicts through denying 
them or fighting until the best „man“ wins. 
• Rewards are based on the principle of 
equality. 
 
• Rewards are based on the principle of jus-
tice. 
• Mangers expected to use intuition, deal 
with feelings, and seek consensus. 
 
• Managers expected to be decisive, firm, 
assertive, competitive, just. 
• Career ambitions are optional for both men 
and women. 
 
• Humanization of work through creation of 
work groups. 
 
• Career ambitions are compulsory for men, 
optional for women. 
 
• Humanization of work through provision 
of task challenge 
 
Sources: Hofstede 2006, p.201; Hofstede 2001, p.312 
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In masculine societies attributes like high income and compliments are desirable 
(cf. Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-98). Feminine cultures are characterized by apprecia-
tion of quality of life and personal contacts (cf. Puck 2004, p.30). Table 5.4 com-
piles major differences between masculine and feminine societies with reference to 
work organization. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance – UAI  
 
The term uncertainty avoidance is used by Hofstede to denote the degree to which 
members of a society feel threatened by unknown or uncertain situations. Members 
of cultures which rate high on uncertainty avoidance will try to avoid or eliminate 
uncertain situations throughout all aspects of life (cf. Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-98). 
Table 5.5 lists the main differences between societies with high and low uncertainty 
avoidance with reference to work organization. 
 
Table 5.5: Differences between societies with high and low uncertainty avoidanc 
 with reference to work organization 
     Low UAI          High UAI 
•  
• Top managers involved in strategy. 
 
•  
• Top managers involved in operations 
• Time is a frame of reference 
 
• Time is money 
• Lower work stress, being busy is not a 
virtue per se 
 
• Higher work stress; inner urge to be busy 
 
• Strong achievement motivation. 
 
• There should be no more rules than neces-
sary 
 
• Strong security motivation. 
 
• Emotional need for rules – even if they are 
inefficient 
 
Sources: Hofstede 2006, p.262; Hofstede 2001, p.169 
 
Long term vs. short term orientation (Confucian Dynamism) – LTO  
 
According to Hofstede, confucian dynamism can be characterized as short term 
(personal steadiness and stability, protection of one’s “face”, respect for traditions) 
and long term orientation (persistence and thrift) (cf. Schneider/Hirt 2007, p.95-98). 
In long term orientated societies a future-oriented way of thinking prevails, which 
raises the disposition to investigate in a relationship (cf. Hofstede 2001, p.361). „ 
(…) Somit dürfen die Absichten des Partners und die Ähnlichkeit des Partners 
wichtig für den Aufbau von Vertrauen sein. Zudem sollte das durch den Partner 
signalisierte Vertrauen, das die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit determiniert, einen 
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vergleichsweise starken Einfluss auf die Entstehung von Vertrauen haben. In kurz-
fristig orientierten Gesellschaften werden demgegenüber kurzfristig Erfolge ange-
strebt, sodass auch opportunistisches Verhalten zur Erlangung kurzfristiger Vorteile 
tendenziell wahrscheinlicher ist“ (cf. Praxmarer 2009, p.624). Table 5.6 summariz-
es the main differences between societies with long term and short term orientation 
in a business context. 
 
Table 5.6: Differences between societies with long term and short term 
 orientation with reference to work organization 
         Low LTO High LTO 
•  
• Main virtues in work are freedom, personal 
rights, achievement and  autonomous 
thinking 
 
 
•  
• Main virtues in work are learning, honesty, 
adaptiveness, responsibility and self-
discipline 
• Emphasis on bottom-line sales 
 
• Emphasis on earnings in the future 
• Superiors and subordinates belong to two 
different psychological realms 
 
• Superiors and subordinates have common 
objectives 
• Meritocracy: economic and social life to be 
ordered by abilities 
 
• Personal duties comply with needs of busi-
ness 
 
• People should live more equally 
 
• Lifelong investing in a network of person-
al relations 
 
Sources: Hofstede 2006, p.311; Hofstede 2001, p.366-367 
 
5.4.3. Critique of the study  
 
Although Hofstede’s study has received the greatest recognition of all cultural stu-
dies, it is not without critique. According to Puck et al. (2004) the main points of 
critique are: the age of the study, the negligence of cultural diversity of a country by 
equating country and culture and the missing representativeness of Hofstede’s di-
mensions for the complex term culture (cf. Eckhardt 2002, p.93). Another main 
concern is the fact that the data was taken exclusively from members of a single 
organization (IBM) (cf. Sivakumar/Nakata 2001, p.556). Hofstede reacted to the 
critique with the words: „ (…) things could be improved and changed, and I hope, 
they are, but this research is a valid and important start“ (cf. Eckhardt 2002, p.93). 
On the other hand a number of studies confirm the usefulness of Hofstede’s dimen-
sions for instance the study of Kogut and Singh (1988) about the influence of cul-
ture on the choice of market entry form or the study of Houston and Eckhardt 
(2001), who investigate consumer behavior and brand loyalty in Asia (cf. Hou-
ston/Eckhardt 2001, p.34-37). 
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5.5. Sociocultural distance as a measure of cultural difference 
 
Researchers at the University of Uppsala developed the concept of “psychic dis-
tance”, which denotes the degree of uncertainty of a firm about the characteristics 
of a foreign market. They postulated, that psychic distance is influenced by differ-
ences in culture and language between home and target country (cf. Kogut 1988, 
p.413). Most studies which emphasize the importance of cultural differences use 
dimension based definitions of culture. Since the late eighties most frequently 
Hofstede’s dimensions have been employed (cf. Brenner 2009, p.53; Apfelthaler 
1999, p.12). Sociocultural distance was frequently used as a measure of cultural 
difference between countries of origin in studies about influence of culture of man-
agement and performance of international joint ventures (cf. Lu 2006, p.436-437). 
Hennart and Larino (1988) define cultural distance as „ (…) the difference between 
the national cultural characteristics of the home and of the host countries” (cf. Hen-
nart/Larimo 1998, p.517).  
 
Prior studies measured sociocultural distance in two distinct ways:  (1) one or more 
single Dimensions of Hofstede’s study represent cultural distance or (2) an index is 
used, which consists of a combination of the four initial dimensions (power dis-
tance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and individuality) and is named after its 
inventors Kogut-Singh-Index (cf. Lu 2006, p.437).  
 
Kogut and Singh (1988) analyzed 228 entries of foreign firms in the US market 
with regard to the chosen institutional form (joint venture, acquisition or green-
field). They noticed considerable differences in the propensity of firms from differ-
ent countries to choose a certain form of entry.  To assess the influence of cultural 
difference between home and host country they created a variable cultural distance 
(Kogut-Singh-Index) from a synthesis of four of Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions. 
The Kogut-Singh-Index is constructed as follows: The deviations of the single cul-
tural dimensions are corrected for their variance, then the corrected dimensions are 
summed up and averaged (cf. Lu 2006, p.437; Hutzschenreuter 2007, p.826). The 
study confirmed that the higher the cultural difference between home and host 
country the greater is the likeliness of a foreign investor to chose a joint venture 
instead of greenfield or acquisition as form of market entry. Firms from a country, 
which culture is considerable different from the culture of the host country, have to 
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bear higher costs if the enter a market by acquisition compared to joint venture or 
greenfield entry. The underlying rationale is the difficulties which arise when the 
parent’s management style has to be transferred to an existing foreign firm due to 
cultural differences. 
 
Kogut-singh-Index was one of the most popular approaches for evaluation of the 
influence of cultural differences on management of international joint ventures (cf. 
Lu 2006, p.437). One major focus of these studies was the influence of cultural 
distance on parent’s ownership share in the venture. Eramilli (1996) analyzed the 
choice of market entry form of parents originating from the US and European coun-
tries like Switzerland, France, Italy and Great Britain. His study showed that par-
ents from the US are more inclined to aim at a majority ownership then parents 
from Europe. Generally he found that the higher a parent’s country rates on power 
distance or uncertainty avoidance the higher is the aspired ownership share. How-
ever, a further result of his study was that the influence of cultural difference on 
market entry form decreases with increasing size of a parent (cf. Erramilli 1996, 
p.242). In another study Pan (1996) found that the greater cultural distance the 
more likely a foreign partner in a joint venture is to choose a majority share (cf. Pan 
1996, p.15). Brouthers K. D. and Brouthers L. E. (2001) investigated market entry 
of Western firms (countries of origin: Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain and US) 
in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Russia 
and Romania). They found that foreign investors prefer joint ventures in countries 
with low investment risk (considering social, economical and political factors) and 
considerable cultural differences. By contrast, they are inclined to choose wholly 
owned subsidiaries in countries with high investment risk. Altogether the findings 
of the studies regarding influence of cultural distance on ownership share are incon-
sistent, however (cf. Lu 2006, p.437). 
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6. Theoretical Framework 
 
6.1. Theories for the study of control of joint ventures 
 
Two theories, which have been useful for the study of joint ventures in the past, 
shall be outlined before the theoretical is presented: resource-based view of bar-
gaining theory and transaction cost theory. 
 
6.1.1. Resource-based theory of bargaining power 
 
From the viewpoint of bargaining theory joint ventures are seen as game between 
partners with different motives, who cooperate and compete at the same time (cf. 
Lax/Sebenius 1986, p.87; Yan/Gray 1994, p.1478). The respective bargaining pow-
er of the joint venture parents determines the pattern of control in a given joint ven-
ture (cf. Blodgett 1991, p.69; Harrigan/Newman 1990, p.427). Bargaining power 
refers to the ability of a party to achieve a concession of the other party and to in-
fluence the results of a negotiation.  
 
The resource-based view suggests, that ownership of critical resources determines 
the proportion of power in intra-organizational relationships (cf. Pfeffer/Salancick 
1978, p.258). The bargaining power of a party increases if it contributes resources 
which are vital for the success of the specific business collaboration and which 
cannot or only at high cost be substituted otherwise (cf. Harrigan/Newman 1990, 
p.422). Lecraw found that particularly three aspects of a multinational corporation 
affect control: technological leadership, extent of advertising and exporting know-
how (cf. Lecraw 1984, p.36; Yan/Gray 1994, p.1482). In the case of a joint venture 
this means that the parent which provides a necessary resource attains more control 
over the corresponding area of activity of the joint venture, given that the other par-
ent is not able to do so to the same degree. 
 
Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) see dependency as a social relationship, which implies 
that dependency is to be understood as a relative construct. In business collabora-
tions the extent to which a partner can exercise control depends on his relative abili-
ty to provide critical resources in comparison to his partner. Accordingly, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that power and influence are relative and in order to assess 
control, the influence of one partner has to be considered in relation to the other 
partners (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.4). Although several studies empirically investi-
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gated the relationship between bargaining power and control (cf. Blodgett 1991; 
Fagre/Wells 1982; Killing 1983; Lecraw 1984), the results are difficult to compare, 
because variables were measured in different ways (cf. Yan/Gray 1994, p.1478).  
 
6.1.2. Transaction cost theory 
 
The basic units of transaction cost theory are transactions (cf. Williamson 1985 
p.41). According to Commons „the individual action is participation in bargaining, 
managing and rationing transactions, which are the ultimate units of economic ac-
tivity.“ (cf. Commons 1931, p.648). These transactions however do not designate 
the physical exchange of goods or services, but acquisition and disposal of liberty 
and property rights, which have to be assigned prior to physical exchange (cf. 
Commons 1931, p.652).  
 
Another basis of transaction cost theory is the postulate of Coase (1937, p.388), that 
the price mechanism in a market and the management of an organization by an en-
trepreneur represent two alternative ways of coordination and control. In a market 
with perfect competition, interplay of demand and supply guarantee efficient allo-
cation. An entirely different coordination mechanism is present in organizations. 
The price mechanism is substituted by management, representing a form of con-
scious coordination (cf. Coase 1937, p.387). Both mechanisms price-mechanism 
and management generate costs. Costs within a market result for instance from ne-
gotiations, evaluation of relevant prices, adaption of long term contracts etc. Like-
wise, there are costs involved in management. These costs, which inevitably accrue 
in a transaction, are the transaction costs (cf. Williamson 1975, p.3). Transaction 
cost theory deals with the question which institutional arrangements are the most 
efficient for coordination of a specific economical transaction, i.e. which produce 
the smallest sum of production and transaction costs (cf. Williamson 1990, p.IX, 
17-18). In market economies the variety of forms of coordination or institutional 
arrangements can be depicted as a spectrum ranging from exchange in a perfect 
market on one end to a centralized hierarchical organizations on the other end (cf. 
Williamson 1990, p.18; Williamson 1991, p.280; Figure 6.1) 
 
48 
Figure 6.1: Market-hierarchy continuum 
 
Source: according to Weder 1989, p. 74 
 
Institutional arrangements can be roughly classified as market exchange, hierar-
chical organization and hybrid forms. Joint ventures as an example of a hybrid ar-
rangement take an intermediate position between the extremes market and hie-
rarchy. An important characteristic of an institutional arrangement is its adaptability 
to changing conditions. Williamson distinguishes autonomous and cooperative me-
chanisms of adaption. Organizations can perform adaptations, which require coor-
dination of partners, generally more quickly and efficiently. By contrast, incentives 
to use resources economically are weaker in organizations. Furthermore, the costs 
for establishing the institutional arrangement itself are generally higher in hierar-
chical organizations. Hybrid institutional arrangements like joint ventures are lo-
cated in a mid range regarding adaptability, administrative effort and incentive to 
use resources economically (cf. Williamson 1991, p.280). Which institutional ar-
rangement is the most efficient depends on one hand on the characteristics of the 
arrangement itself and on the other hand on the characteristics of the transaction (cf. 
Williamson 1991, p.277). Characteristics of a transaction are frequency, uncertainty 
and asset specificity (cf. Williamson 1991, p.281). The most important characteris-
tic of a transaction is asset specificity. Asset specificity originates from investments 
which are tailored for a specific transaction. For instance, a product for a certain 
customer can be produced at lower cost using a special technology, which was de-
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veloped entirely for this purpose, compared to a general purpose technology. How-
ever, a dependency on the customer develops, because the same investment has a 
comparable lower value in alternative transactions (cf. Williamson 1990, p.63). As 
a result the transaction partner has the possibility to take advantage of this depen-
dency, which will lead to higher transaction costs, either because he opportunisti-
cally insists on an adaption of the agreement or because of measures which shall 
inhibit such opportunistic behavior (cf. Ebers/Gotsch 2002, p.228).  
 
6.2. Theoretical model 
 
The study of control in joint ventures shall take into account aspects of transaction 
cost theory and resource-based view. Special focus is laid on the influence of re-
source contribution of partners on control extent and the effect of sociocultural dis-
tance.  
 
6.2.1. Influence of sociocultural distance on control 
 
For assessment of the influence of cultural differences on control of international 
joint ventures thoughts based on transaction cost theory shall be applied. Kogut and 
Singh (1988, p.412) point to the usefulness of supplementing transaction cost 
theory with factors from an institutional and cultural context. Differences between 
national cultures result in different organizational and administrative management 
styles and different expectations of employees. The greater the sociocultural dis-
tance between two countries is the more organizational practices should differ (cf. 
Kogut/Singh 1988, p.414). The question is left to answer what the most efficient 
institutional arrangement for a certain country is. 
 
As a general rule one can expect that the greater the sociocultural differences be-
tween home and host country the lower on average the extent of control of the for-
eign parent will be. One reason might be that a culture which is very different from 
the culture of the home country is associated with high uncertainty by the manage-
ment of the foreign parent. If the home country is characterized by uncertainty 
avoidance, the management could assign a lower value to the foreign investment, 
and hence aim at a lower participation. Likewise, disapproval of the values and 
practices in the host country could make investors shy away from dominant control. 
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Another aspect of sociocultural distance is the fact, that the greater the cultural dif-
ferences between home and host country the more difficult implementation or 
transfer of managerial practices will be, due to for instance language barriers or 
differences in mentality (cf. Killing 1983, p. 56). These difficulties result in higher 
costs for implementation of control measures (cf. Kogut/Singh 1988, p.414). Fur-
thermore sociocultural distance leads to high information needs, and subsequently 
high information costs. By delegating management responsibilities to a local part-
ner firms can avoid these costs (cf. Gatignon/Anderson 1988, p.311). If the soci-
ocultural distance between home and host country is substantial, ceding control to a 
local partner might be efficient, because he can make better use of local market 
knowledge or relations with local authorities.  
 
Thus the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1. The higher sociocultural distance between Austria and the joint venture 
host country the more likely is a low extent of control of the Austrian parent. 
 
6.2.2. Influence of provision of non-capital resources on control 
 
According to the resource-based view the bargaining power of a party and along 
with it the ability to exercise control increase with the extent by which it contributes 
critical resources to an enterprise. According to Killing (1983, p. 54) in a joint ven-
ture the pattern of control is determined by the characteristics of contributed re-
sources. If both partners contribute critical resources (e.g. technology and market-
ing knowhow), then shared control is likely (cf. Yan/Gray 1994, p.1482). Provision 
of non-capital resources can enhance control extent of a parent in various ways. 
They comprise contractual arrangements, establishment of trust, creation of depen-
dency on the competences of the providing parent and appointment of management 
positions (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.5). Frequently non-capital resources are provided 
on the basis of a contractual agreement. The contract usually allocates property 
rights and can contain stipulations about competences of management regarding the 
deployment of these resources. A parent can prevent leakage of own knowhow to 
partners by means of contracts, which regulate who is allowed to manage resources 
and to make use of them. With the use of contracts, provision of knowhow creates a 
legally protected ability to exercise control. Nevertheless provision of non-capital 
resources can influence the extent of control also without legal bondage. Trust, as a 
result of apparent commitment to the objectives of the venture, can be another 
source of a parent’s ability to exercise control. Provision of resources, which in-
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clude a large amount of tacit knowhow, makes the partner of the providing parent 
dependent on his expertise. This dependency can enhance the ability to control in 
two ways: First, by means of providing advice, the provider can influence how the 
resource is utilized and second, dependency increases bargaining power and along 
with it the ability to control. Last but not least, in most cases transfer of knowhow 
is only possible by transfer of personnel. By providing non-capital resources a par-
ent can appoint more key-positions with own managers, and thus gain a greater 
extent of control (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.5f). Contribution of specific knowhow 
should increase control also from the view of transaction cost theory. If a parent 
provides specific knowhow then asset specificity is present. Consequently, the 
more specific knowhow he contributes the more efficient it is to invest in control. 
 
Thus, a second hypothesis is proposed: 
H2.  The more knowhow the Austrian parent contributes the more likely is a 
high extent of control of the Austrian parent. 
 
6.2.3. Control variables 
 
To prevent false conclusions resulting from spurious relationships, the following 
control variables are included in the model: capital share, appointment of manage-
ment positions, international experience of the Austrian parent and sector of econ-
omy of the joint venture.  
 
Equity share 
 
Equity share provides for legal possibilities to control principle behavior of a joint 
venture. A high capital share can for instance grant the right to appoint members of 
the board of directors of the venture. This in turn will enhance a partner’s ability to 
appoint management positions (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.5) Accordingly, the higher 
the capital share of the Austrian parent the more likely a great extent of control 
should be. 
 
Appointment of management positions 
 
As was mentioned above, the ability of a parent to appoint management positions 
may be a result of its capital share or of his provision of non-capital resources. Be-
cause appointing management functions is a very effective mechanism of control, 
its influence on control shall be controlled separately. 
52 
 
International Experience of the Austrian parents 
 
Firms, which are less experienced in international business, have few knowledge 
about monitoring and controlling foreign subsidiaries, particularly if the output 
cannot be measured by objective criteria. It is likely, that they will make false deci-
sions in attempting to exercise control, which results in lower efficiency (cf. Gatig-
non/Anderson 1988, p.310). A low extent of control should be favorably in these 
cases. Hence, international experience of Austrian parents should positively corre-
late with extent of control. 
 
Sector of economy of joint ventures 
 
It might be, that requirements regarding control vary according to the industry of 
joint ventures. Ventures, which belong to service industries, may have other needs 
than manufacturing joint ventures (Kogut/Singh, 1988, p. 421). No assumption is 
made about the direction of influence of this dichotomous variable. 
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7. Empirical Study of Austrian Joint Ventures in CEE 
 
7.1. Data collection 
 
The research is based on an inquiry of forty small and medium sized enterprises 
from Austria in spring 2002 (first phase) and a set of fourteen additional selected 
firms one year later (second phase) by means of a self-administered questionnaire. 
Target subjects were executives of Austrian enterprises, which participated in  joint 
ventures located in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary or Slovenia. Of 250 
sent questionnaires 60 were returned and correctly answered establishing a rate of 
return of twenty five per cent. 
 
7.1.1. Collected information about Austrian parents 
 
Information about the parent’s industry, size, diversification and internationalize-
tion was collected. 
 
Industry 
 
Four out of ten Austrian parents are in manufacturing industries. A further twenty 
five per cent are trading firms followed by twenty per cent in business related ser-
vices and ten per cent in financial services.  
 
Parent size 
 
A third of the Austrian parents has fewer than fifty employees and annual sales less 
than five million euro, while one half of these has annual sales less than 700.000 
euro. About a fifth of the Austrian parents are large firms with more than one thou-
sand employees. 
 
Parent Diversification 
 
Roughly a quarter of the parents is engaged in only one product category, whereas 
one fifth is engaged in nine or more product categories. 
  
Internationalization  
 
More than a half of Austrian parents have a share of more than forty per cent of 
foreign sales, whereas a quarter has shares of foreign sales less than twenty per 
54 
cent. A sixth part of Austrian parents operates in only one foreign country, whereas 
one third has foreign subsidiaries in more than nine countries. Most of the Austrian 
parents (85%) have more than nine years of experience with international business. 
Accordingly, four out of five respondents rate their company’s knowhow high re-
spectively very high with regard to management of foreign subsidiaries. 
 
7.1.2. Collected information about joint ventures 
 
Host country 
 
Of sixty joint ventures a third was located in the Czech Republic, a quarter in Pol-
and and Hungary respectively and a tenth part in Slovakia and Slovenia respective-
ly. Table 7.1 shows the frequencies. 
 
Table 7.1: Frequencies: joint venture host countries 
 frequency percentage 
Czech Republic 19 31,7 
Slovakia 6 10,0 
Poland 14 23,3 
Hungary 15 25,0 
Slovenia 6 10,0 
Total 60 100,0 
 
Joint venture industry 
 
Nearly all joint ventures belong to the same industry as the Austrian parent. Only 
five joint ventures of the sample are located in a different industry and in only two 
cases the joint venture activity does not belong to the core business of the Austrian 
parent. 
 
Number of partners 
 
Nine out of ten joint ventures in the sample are co-operations between two firms. 
The remaining joint ventures are co-operations between three, four five and seven 
partners respectively. 
 
Year of foundation 
 
The joint ventures of the sample were founded between 1985 and 2004, whereby 
the number of foundations per year increased between 1985 and 1991 from one to a 
55 
maximum of ten and subsequently decreased between 1991 and 2004 from ten to 
one. 
 
Joint venture size 
 
Approximately one half of the joint ventures in the sample (n=29) have annual sales 
between one and ten million euro. A tenth part has sales below 500.000 euro and a 
further tenth between 500.000 and 1 million euro. Fifteen per cent of joint ventures 
have sales between ten and one hundred million euro and only three ventures have a 
turnover higher than one hundred million euro.  Sixteen of the joint ventures in the 
sample have less than ten employees and further six between ten and thirty. A quar-
ter of the joint ventures has between thirty and one hundred employees and a fur-
ther quarter between one hundred and four hundred respectively. The two largest 
joint ventures have 1.800 and 2.500 employees respectively. 
 
Uncertainty of business environment 
 
Respondents were asked to assess factors for the choice of entry of the Austrian 
parent (cf. Table 7.2). Political stability is estimated higher than the stability of reg-
ulatory framework. Whereas forty per cent of Austrian executives rate political sta-
bility low respectively very low considerable sixty per cent rate stability of regula-
tory framework low respectively very low. Only a seventh part of respondents rates 
cultural distance high respectively very high. By contrast, more than a half of the 
managers rate cultural distance low respectively very low. 
Two thirds of respondents estimate the intensity of competition high respectively 
very high. Followers in the rank order of uncertainty factors are entry of new com-
petitors and new product development. Variation of market prices, alteration of 
industry knowhow and uncertainty of demand are rated less serious. 
 
Joint venture strategy 
 
Respondents were asked, whether legal restrictions influenced the choice of joint 
venture as entry form. Altogether, this applies only to a minor degree. About fifty 
per cent of executives say, that legal restrictions had no or only a small influence on 
the choice of entry mode. However, a quarter rates the importance of legal restric-
tions high respectively very high. 
  
56 
Ta
bl
e 
7.
2:
 D
ec
isi
on
 fa
ct
or
s f
or
 th
e 
en
try
 st
ra
te
gy
 o
f t
he
 A
us
tri
an
 p
ar
en
ts 
St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n 
1,
01
9 
,8
94
 
,9
98
 
,9
55
 
1,
06
4 
,9
66
 
1,
22
9 
1,
14
9 
1,
19
6 
1,
02
5 
10
,9
5 
1,
28
8 
N
ot
es
: a
ll 
fa
ct
or
s w
er
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 a
 fi
ve
 p
oi
nt
 sc
al
e 
w
ith
 v
al
ue
s r
an
gi
ng
 fr
om
 1
 –
“d
is
ag
re
e 
st
ro
ng
ly
” 
to
 5
 –
 “
ag
re
e 
st
ro
ng
ly
”.
 m
ea
n 
4,
25
 
2,
58
 
3,
63
 
3,
32
 
2,
73
 
2,
78
 
3,
27
 
3,
08
 
3,
81
 
3,
14
 
2,
90
 
2,
59
 
N
 
60
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
59
 
39
 
59
 
 
Th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
pa
re
nt
 p
os
se
ss
es
 c
on
si
de
ra
bl
e 
kn
ow
ho
w
 re
ga
rd
in
g 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f f
or
ei
gn
 su
bs
id
ia
rie
s 
C
ul
tu
ra
l d
is
ta
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
A
us
tri
a 
an
d 
th
e 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 h
ig
h 
Po
lit
ic
al
 st
ab
ili
ty
 in
 th
e 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 h
ig
h 
St
ab
ili
ty
 o
f r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
in
 th
e 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
 is
 h
ig
h 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 ri
sk
 is
 h
ig
h 
in
 th
e 
ho
st
 c
ou
nt
ry
 
D
em
an
d 
is
 u
nc
er
ta
in
 
N
ew
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s e
nt
er
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t f
re
qu
en
tly
 
M
ar
ke
t p
ric
es
 v
ar
y 
co
ns
id
er
ab
ly
 
C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
is
 fi
er
ce
 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 a
re
 su
bj
ec
t t
o 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
er
m
an
en
tly
 
In
du
st
ry
 k
no
w
ho
w
 a
lte
rs
 q
ui
ck
ly
 
C
ho
ic
e 
of
 e
nt
ry
 fo
rm
 w
as
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 le
ga
l r
es
tri
ct
io
ns
 
 
  
57 
Resource provision of parents 
 
Provision of capital 
 
To measure the amount of capital provided by the Austrian parents, local partners 
and others, respondents were asked to estimate the respective percentages of in-
vested capital. The joint ventures were classified according to prevalent patterns of 
capital provision (cf. Blodgett 1991, p.70). The most frequent pattern in the sample 
is a considerable majority share (>51%) either of the Austrian parent or of the for-
eign partner (cf. Figure 7.1). Inside this category the predominant form of participa-
tion (n=36) is a majority share of the Austrian partner and only a small proportion 
of joint ventures (n=6) have a foreign majority share. The second most frequent 
type of pattern (n=12) is an equal share of both or all partners. Another form of 
shareholding structure, which is frequently applied in developing countries and 
emerging markets and was especially common in Eastern Europe before the fall of 
the iron curtain, assigns a minimal majority  (51%) to one partner. Often this form 
is chosen due to legal restrictions, which serve as an regulatory instrument to pro-
tect local interests against the influence of foreign investors. Only a few joint ven-
tures in the sample (n=5) belong to this category. As before, most joints ventures in 
this category have an Austrian majority share (n=4). 
 
Figure 7.1: Frequencies:  equity distribution types 
Source: Author 
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Provision of knowhow 
 
To measure the share of knowhow contribution of the joint venture partners, res-
pondents were asked to rate the extent of resource provision of both the Austrian 
parent and the local partner on a seven point scale (values ranging from 1 – “applies 
not at all” to 7 - “applies definitely”) in twelve categories: (1) production and logis-
tics, (2) sourcing, (3) marketing, sourcing, (3) marketing, (4) personnel recruitment, 
(5) sales, (6) services, (7) corporate planning, (8) controlling, (9) funding, (10) re-
search and development, (11) organization, (12) strategic planning. In addition they 
were asked to which extent the local partner contributes (13) local market know-
ledge and (14) relations with local authorities (cf. Table 7.3). 
In all joint ventures of the sample the Austrian parents contributed know how in at 
least one category, whereas knowhow was provided by local partners in fifty and 
six cases. Apart from local market knowledge and relations with local authorities a 
majority of knowhow provision by the local partner is likely only in the category 
personnel recruitment. In all the other areas a major resource provision of the Aus-
trian parent is more likely and especially significant in the areas production and 
logistics, marketing, corporate planning, controlling, funding, research and devel-
opment, organization and strategic planning. 
 
Appointments of management functions 
 
Respondents were asked whether a specific management responsibility is assigned 
to the Austrian parent, the local parent or to both. Appointment of the joint venture 
general manager is equally likely by Austrian and local parent (cf. Table 7.4). 
Twenty and six joint ventures have Austrian general managers and twenty for have 
general managers from the host country. The situation is different with the ap-
pointment of deputy general managers. If this position exists, it is more frequently 
appointed by the local parent. 
Only few joint ventures in the sample (n=17) have a board of directors. In all but 
two cases the chairman is appointed by the Austrian parent, whereas appointment 
of the deputy chairman is more balanced. A majority of joint ventures has Austrian 
heads of department in the areas funding and strategy. Appointment of the man-
agement function organization is balanced. Interestingly appointment of heads of 
department in the areas marketing as well as production and logistics is more likely 
by the local parent, although Austrian parents are more likely to provide knowhow 
in these areas.  
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By contrast, predominant appointment of the management function human resource 
management by local parents corresponds to the likeliness of resource provision by 
local partners in this area. 
 
Table 7.4: Appointment of management positions by parents 
 N 
Austrian  
parent 
Local  
partner conjoint 
 
General manager 54 26 24 4 
 
Deputy general manager 45 15 28 2 
Chairman 17 15 2  
 
Deputy chairman 16 7 9  
Production and Logistics 46 13 31 2 
Marketing 48 17 27 4 
Funding 47 30 14 3 
Strategy 48 34 10 4 
Organization 49 23 23 3 
Human Resource Management 48 10 37 1 
 
 
Control extent 
As was mentioned in the theoretical part on joint venture control, it is important to 
distinguish between extent of control and the mechanisms, which are employed to 
exercise control. To measure extent of control only the respondent’s subjective as-
sessment of the Austrian parent’s as well as the local parent’s influence was used as 
a proxy. Respondents were asked to rate their and the partner’s influence on a seven 
point scale regarding decision making in sixteen areas: (1) joint venture strategy, 
(2) organizational form of joint venture, (3) product program, (4) personnel recruit-
ing, (5) personnel remuneration, (6) personnel training, (7) production program, (8) 
product prices, (9) marketing activities, (10) advertising activities, (11) selection of 
suppliers, (12) investment projects, (13) selection of outside creditors, (14) invest-
ment funding, (15) deployment of accounting and controlling systems, (16) selec-
tion of  cooperative partners. Table 7.5 summarizes the mean influence of Austrian 
and local partners. Austrian parents have a predominant influence. The mean influ-
ence of Austrian parents is higher in all categories except personnel recruitment, 
personnel remuneration and personnel training. In addition, the likeliness of a high-
er influence of local partners is significant only in the area personnel recruiting. 
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Table 7.5: Influence of Austrian and local parents on decision-making 
  Austrian parent  Local parent 
 N Mean 
standard 
deviation  Mean 
standard 
deviation 
Joint venture strategy 57 6,10 ,969  3,25*** 1,430 
Organizational form 56 5,68 1,501  3,25*** 1,729 
Product program 55 5,41 1,416  3,27*** 1,694 
Personnel recruiting 57 3,48 1,799  4,39* 2,161 
Personnel remuneration 55 3,69 1,684  4,24 2,018 
Personnel training 57 3,76 1,633  3,93 2,095 
Production program 52 4,64 2,013  2,98*** 1,852 
Product prices 56 4,54 1,822  3,98 1,977 
Marketing activities 57 4,68 1,490  3,39** 1,906 
Advertising activities 56 4,09 1,730  3,64 2,084 
Selection of suppliers 56 4,24 1,869  3,80 1,967 
Investment projects 56 5,40 1,806  3,14*** 1,742 
Selection of outside creditors 54 4,86 2,310  2,54*** 1,599 
Investment funding 56 5,24 1,977  2,66*** 1,587 
 
Deployment of accounting 
and controlling systems 56 5,47 1,732  2,71*** 1,486 
Selection of cooperative 
partners 57 4,81 1,861  3,39** 1,868 
Notes: All factors were estimated using a seven point scale with values rang-
ing from 1 - "applies not at all" to 7 - "applies definitely". 
Differences in means were tested with paired samples t-test. 
* p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
By contrast, the predominant influence of Austrian parents is especially significant 
in the areas joint venture strategy, organizational form of joint venture, product 
program, production program, investment projects, selection of outside creditors, 
investment funding and deployment of accounting and controlling systems and in-
significant only in the areas product prices, advertising activities and selection of 
suppliers. Using reliability analysis the items of the Austrian and local parent were 
tested  whether they can be aggregated to an overall variable of influence, which 
seems statistically reasonable (α=0,905 and α=0,945 respectively)(cf. Table 7.6 and 
7.7). 
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Table 7.6: Reliability - influence of  Austrian parents α = 0,905 
Item 
Cronbach’s Alpha, if Item 
omitted 
Joint venture strategy ,898 
Organizational form ,898 
Product program ,896 
Personnel recruiting ,901 
Personnel remuneration ,897 
Personnel training ,894 
Production program ,902 
Product prices ,900 
Marketing activities ,899 
Advertising activities ,900 
Selection of suppliers ,907 
Investment projects ,895 
Selection of outside creditors ,898 
Investment funding ,899 
 
Deployment of accounting and controlling systems ,904 
Selection of cooperative partners ,898 
 
Table 7.7: Reliability - influence of local partners α = 0,945 
Item 
Cronbach’s Alpha, if Item 
omitted 
Joint venture strategy ,943 
Organizational form ,941 
Product program ,942 
Personnel recruiting ,941 
Personnel remuneration ,939 
Personnel training ,940 
Production program ,940 
Product prices ,944 
Marketing activities ,941 
Advertising activities ,941 
Selection of suppliers ,941 
Investment projects ,940 
Selection of outside creditors ,945 
Investment funding ,945 
 
Deployment of accounting and controlling systems ,943 
Selection of cooperative partners ,942 
 
A further object of investigation was if Austrian parents prefer their own manage-
ment systems. Respondents were asked, if the management system of their parent 
resembles that of the joint venture. This was confirmed in almost all valid answers 
(95%, n=36). In only two cases the management system of the joint venture was 
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considered to be different from the Austrian parent’s system, which is a further in-
dication of the dominant Austrian influence. 
 
7.2. Validation of the existence of a real joint venture 
 
In chapter two the essential characteristics of a joint venture were described: (1) the 
legal and economical independency of the parties (2) conjoint management of the 
enterprise and (3) shared bearing of the (financial) risks resulting from the enter-
prise. Each case in the sample was tested regarding fulfillment of these criteria. All 
kinds of resource contribution were regarded as bearing of risks, provision of capi-
tal resources as well as contribution of non-capital resources. If both partners had 
an influence greater “1” in at least one area respectively, the criterion of conjoint 
management was met. After this test 54 cases out of initial 60 could be retained in 
the sample. Table 7.8 shows the frequencies. 
 
Table 7.8: Fulfillment of joint venture  criteria 
 frequency 
 Yes No 
Shared bearing of risks 57 3 
Conjoint management 54 6 
Shared bearing of risks plus conjoint management 54 6 
 
7.3. Operationalization of variables 
 
7.3.1. Extent of control 
 
Extent of control is operationalized in two different ways. Variable DECISION 
measures extent of control by aggregating the scores of relative influence of the 
Austrian parent on various areas of decision. The relative influence of the Austrian 
parents compared to the local parents was calculated as follows: In each area of 
influence the score of the local partner was subtracted from the score of the Aus-
trian parent. This seemes to be statistically acceptable due to a prior test of reliabili-
ty of the combination of items regarding influence of Austrian and local parents (α= 
0,869). Further it was assumed that certain areas of influence might be of varying 
importance in different enterprises o have no importance at all. For instance in-
fluencing marketing activities can be very important for a joint venture in the 
branch of high quality consumer goods, but almost irrelevant for a joint venture 
which is a mere supplier. Because of the aforementioned, the mean of scores was 
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created, irrespective of the number of mentioned influence areas in the question-
naire. 
 
Alternatively Variable KEYPOS uses the extent of appointment of management 
positions as a proxy of control extent. To measure the extent by which parents ap-
point management key positions the corresponding items were re-coded in the fol-
lowing way: If a management position was appointed by the Austrian parent the 
item was assigned a value of “1”, a value of “0” in the case of appointment by the 
local parent and “0,5” if both parents participated in the management responsibili-
ties. Afterwards the items were summed and averaged. Due to the fact, that only a 
few joint ventures in the sample have a board of directors, the respective items were 
omitted in the calculation. A subsequent reliability analysis yielded the following 
satisfactory results: 
 
Table 7.9: Reliability - appointment of management positions 
Cronbach’s Alpha = ,824 
Item 
corrected item-
scale-correlation 
Cronbach’s Alpha, if 
Item omitted 
 
General manager ,567 ,800 
 
Deputy general manager ,317 ,834 
Production and Logistics ,605 ,795 
Marketing ,708 ,779 
Funding ,418 ,820 
Strategy ,592 ,798 
Organization ,606 ,794 
Human Resource Management ,578 ,800 
 
 
7.3.2. Sociocultural distance between Austria and host countries 
 
Sociocultural distance between Austria and the joint venture target countries was 
measured in two different ways. Variable KSI measures sociocultural distance by 
means of the Kogut-Singh-Index. This index is based on four of Hofstede’s (2001) 
dimensions (power distance – PDI, uncertainty avoidance – UAI, individualism – 
IDV and masculinity/femininity – MAS). For each cultural dimension the differ-
ence between each target country and Austria was calculated. The differences were 
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corrected for the variance in each dimension, then their sum was calculated and 
averaged. Algebraically the formula is:  
 
𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑗 =  ���𝐼𝑖𝑗 − 𝐼𝑖𝑎�
2
𝑉𝑖
�44
𝑖=1
 
 
whereby  KSIj stands for the sociocultural difference between Austria and country j, 
a denotes Austria, Iij is the index of dimension i and country j and Vi is the variance 
of cultural dimension i. Table 7.10 shows the country scores in each dimension and 
the sociocultural distance to Austria. 
 
Table 7.10: Indexes of cultural dimensions and sociocultural distance                   
from Austria of host countries 
Country PDI UAI IDV MAS KSI 
Austria                        11 70 55 79 - 
Czech Republic                     57 74 58 57 1,43 
Slovakia                       104 51 52 110 5,28 
Poland                         68 93 60 64 2,07 
Hungary                        46 82 80 88 1,01 
Slovenia                       71 88 27 19 4,76 
 
 
Alternatively sociocultural distance is measured by means of the perceived cultural 
distance to the host country reported by the Austrian respondents. Variable CULT-
DIST measures perceived cultural distance on a five point scale. 
 
7.3.3. Extent of knowhow contribution 
 
As was said in chapter 6.1.1 for studying control in joint ventures it is important not 
to consider the partners isolated but their relationship. Consequently, analogous to 
construction of variable DECISION for building variable KNOW the differences 
between partners in each category of knowhow contribution were calculated, 
summed and averaged (Alpha of combined items regarding knowhow provision of 
Austrian and local parents = 0,847). 
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7.3.4. Equity share of Austrian parents 
 
Variable EQUITY measures the share of Austrian parent’s capital investment with 
the percentage of equity share. 
 
7.3.5. Foreign experience of Austrian parents 
 
In order to assess foreign experience of the Austrian parents variable EXPE-
RIENCE is made up of the following variables: number of countries in which the 
parent is engaged, number of years of foreign experience, number of years of expe-
rience in the host country. A subsequent reliability analysis yielded acceptable re-
sults (α=0,409). 
 
7.3.6. Economy sector of joint ventures 
 
A dummy variable SECTOR was created with the value “1” if a joint venture be-
longs to manufacturing industries and a value of “0” if it belongs to service indus-
tries. 
 
7.4. Results 
 
To test the hypotheses, which were proposed in chapter 6, the influence of sociocul-
tural distance (hypothesis 1) and extent of knowhow contribution (hypothesis 2) on 
extent of control was investigated by means of ordinary least square regression. 
In preliminary attempts to assess the impact of sociocultural distance on extent of 
control by means of the Kogut-Singh-Index no significant influence was detected. 
Consequently variable KSI was removed from the model and sociocultural distance 
was only measured using the perceived cultural difference reported by the respon-
dents (CULTDIST). There might be several reasons why the Kogut-Singh-Index 
was not useful in this case. One possible explanation might be that aggregation of 
individual dimensions of Hofstede represents an inacceptable reduction of their 
meaning (cf. Lu 2006, p.439). The effects of sociocultural distance might be so 
subtle that they can only be detected between countries with very different cultures 
(cf. Eramilli 1996, p.237). 
Another reason for the meaninglessness might be rooted in the fact that the actual 
measurement of the country scores took place long ago. The country scores could 
have changed substantially in the meantime due to the country’s transition process 
or as a result of cultural assimilation (cf. Puck et al 2004). 
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Finally four different models were established to test the hypotheses H1 and H2. 
Model 1 tests the impact of knowhow contribution and sociocultural distance on 
control extent with DECISION as dependent variable and KNOW and CULTDIST 
as explanatory variables. Model 2 is similar to Model 1 except that it includes the 
control variables EQUITY, EXPERIENCE and SECTOR. Model 3 and 4 measure 
extent of control with KEYPOS as dependent variable. Both models use KNOW 
and CULTDIST as explanatory variables, whereas model 4 additionally includes 
the control variables EQUITY, EXPERIENCE and SECTOR. 
 
Table 7.11 shows the correlations of these variables. KNOW has a strong positive 
correlation with DECISION as well as KEYPOS and both correlations are highly 
significant.  CULTDIST has a weaker correlation with both DECISION and KEY-
POS but the correlation has the expected negative sign. EXPERIENCE is negative-
ly correlated to KNOW. This might indicate that more experienced firms tend to 
utilize resources of their partners to a higher degree. SECTOR is positively corre-
lated to EXPERIENCE, which shows that firms in manufacturing are more expe-
rienced than firms in service industries. 
 
Table 7.12: Regression Models 1&2 (ordinary least squares) 
Extent of Control (DECISION) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Parameter Estimates   
KNOW ,700*** ,754*** 
CULTDIST -2,27** -,155 
EQUITY - -,037 
EXPERIENCE - ,137 
SECTOR - ,106 
   
Model  Statistics   
N 54 52 
F 24,858*** 10,497*** 
Adjusted multiple R² ,474 ,482 
Notes:   * **(p ≤ .01)   **(p ≤ .05) *(p ≤ .1) 
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Table 7.12 shows the results of the regression of models 1 and 2. In these two mod-
els extent of control was measured by aggregating the scores of relative influence 
on various areas of decision of the Austrian parent. In both models extent of know-
how contribution (KNOW) positively contributes to control extent and is highly 
significant in accordance with hypothesis H2. Sociocultural distance (CULTDIST) 
has the expected negative sign in compliance with hypothesis H1 but is significant 
only in model 1 where no control variables are included. Contrary to the expecta-
tions the control variables are EQUITY, EXPERIENCE and SECTOR are insigni-
ficant.  
 
Table 7.13: Regression Models 3&4 (ordinary least squares) 
Extent of Control (KEYPOS) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Parameter Estimates   
KNOW ,429*** ,425*** 
CULTDIST -2,24* -,269* 
EQUITY - -,032 
EXPERIENCE - -,031 
SECTOR - -,085 
   
Model  Statistics   
N 48 46 
F 5,705** 2,531** 
Adjusted multiple R² ,167 ,145 
Notes:   * **(p ≤ .001)   **(p ≤ .05) *(p ≤ .1) 
 
Results of regression of models 3 and 4 are provided in table 7.13. In these two 
models extent of control was measured by the relative extent to which the Austrian 
parent appoints key management positions. As in models 1 and 2 knowhow contri-
bution (KNOW) positively contributes to control extent, but the strength of influ-
ence is weaker compared to models 1 and 2. Nevertheless KNOW is highly signifi-
cant in both models 3 and 4. Sociocultural distance (CULTDIST) has a negative 
bearing on control extent and is significant. The influence of CULTDIST is even 
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slightly stronger in model 4 where control variables are present. Again, the control 
variables EQUITY, CULTDIST and SECTOR are not significant. 
All four models were tested for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation 
factors and no sign of multicollinearity was found. 
 
7.5. Conclusions 
 
7.5.1. Influence of sociocultural distance 
 
Statistical tests of the models show that sociocultural differences have an influence 
on managerial decisions and extent of control. The results are however only partial-
ly significant. When extent of control was measured by the extent of influence on 
decision-making (DECISION) sociocultural distance has a significant effect only 
when the control variables are not included in the test. When extent of control is 
measured by degree of appointment of management positions (KEYPOS) the influ-
ence of sociocultural distance is weaker but significant also when control variables 
are included. Based on these results it is appropriate to accept hypothesis H1 so we 
can say that: 
 
The higher sociocultural distance between Austria and the joint venture host 
country the more likely is a low extent of control of the Austrian parent. 
 
The results confirm the propositions of transaction cost theory and suggest that 
managers should consider cultural differences when entering foreign markets and 
design the control structure of joint ventures. The influence of sociocultural dis-
tance is also notable considering that the all countries in the sample participate in 
the process of unification inside the EU (cf. Eramilli, 1996, p. 245). It is interesting 
to see that the effect of sociocultural distance is determined rather by the perception 
of the foreign investor. It would be interesting in this respect to investigate how 
foreign parents from other countries are influenced by sociocultural distance when 
investing in CEE. 
 
7.5.2. Influence of knowhow provision 
 
The influence of extent of knowhow provision (KNOW) is strong in all four models 
and highly significant. Statistical test confirm hypothesis H2 so we can say that: 
 
71 
The more knowhow the Austrian parent contributes the more likely is a high 
extent of control of the Austrian parent. 
 
This result meets the expectations and confirms the propositions of transaction cost 
theory and resource-based view of bargaining theory. It is also in line with a num-
ber of empirical studies (cf. Child/Yan 1999, p.14; Killing 1983, p. 53; Windsper-
ger 2009, p.499; Yan/Gray 1994, p.1497; Yan/Child 2004, p.292). The results sug-
gest that Austrian parents should provide primarily critical knowhow in order to 
exercise control over joint ventures in CEE. 
 
7.5.3. Limitations 
 
The empirical study however has limitations. The database in the sample is by no 
means a large and statistically random sample and representativeness of the sample 
was not tested. Further no test of bias by non-response was undertaken. 
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Appendix A: Abstract (in German) 
 
Die Internationalisierung ihrer Geschäftsbereiche ist eine der wichtigsten Aufga-
ben, vor die sich Unternehmen heutzutage gestellt sehen. Die Globalisierung der 
Wirtschaft setzt die Unternehmen zunehmend unter Zugzwang neue Absatzmärkte 
zu erschließen.  
 
Die Kooperationsform Joint Venture hat sich in zunehmendem Masse als ein Mittel 
zur  Internationalisierung etabliert. Oftmals ist diese Form der Kooperation jedoch 
von nur kurzer Dauer, weil die Erwartungen, die in die Kooperation gesetzt wur-
den, nicht erfüllt werden konnten. Es stellt sich Frage ob und wie durch effizientes 
Joint Venture Management im Einzelfall eine dauerhaftere Zusammenarbeit ermög-
licht werden kann. Einer entscheidenden Bedeutung hierbei kommt der Steuerung 
und Kontrolle zugute. Darunter versteht man das spezifische Vermögen der einzel-
nen Partner  operationelle und strategische Entscheidungen im Rahmen des Macht-
gefüges einer Kooperation durchsetzen zu können. 
 
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, nach der grundsätzlichen Festlegung auf die Internationalisie-
rungsform Joint Venture, theoretisch fundierte und empirisch gestützte Aussagen 
über die Steuerung und Kontrolle in Joint Ventures in Osteuropa zu gewinnen. Des 
Weiteren soll untersucht werden wie in diesem speziellen Umfeld eine kosteneffi-
ziente Steuerung und Kontrolle durchgeführt werden kann.  
 
Als Grundlage der Analyse dienen theoretische Erkenntnisse über Charakteristika 
sowie Vor- und Nachteile der Markteintrittsstrategie Joint Venture sowie theoreti-
sche Grundlagen und Aspekte der Steuerung und Kontrolle in Unternehmenskoope-
rationen. Die theoretischen Erkenntnisse werden durch einen Überblick über die 
kulturellen, geographischen und ökonomischen Umstände in Osteuropa ergänzt, 
sowie die Möglichkeiten und Schwierigkeiten des Markteintritts in diesen Wirt-
schaftsraum. Darauf aufbauend folgt eine vertiefende Betrachtung der wirtschaftli-
chen und kulturellen Einflussfaktoren auf Steuerung und Kontrolle in Joint Venture 
Beziehungen. Besonderes Augenmerk soll dabei auf die Zusammenhänge zwischen 
kulturellen Unterschieden der Partnerländer, dem in das Joint Venture eingebrach-
ten Knowhow der Partner und der Verteilung der Entscheidungsbefugnisse gelegt 
werden.  
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Anhand eines empirischen Vergleichs von 54 österreichischen Joint Ventures in 5 
osteuropäischen Ländern, werden die theoretischen Fragestellungen überprüft.  
 
In einer zusammenfassenden Schlussbetrachtung sollen die wichtigsten Erkenntnis-
se rekapituliert und Implikationen für das Management diskutiert werden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Markteintritt durch Joint Venture, Managementkultur, soziokul-
turelle Distanz, Transaktionskostentheorie, Ressourcentheorie 
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